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1 
1. Introduction / 
This thesis is concerned with the innocent passage ofwarcraft. It deals not, only with war-
ships but also with submarines and aircrafts. 
The territorial sea of a state is part of its sovereign territory. 1 The coastal state exercises 
there rights and duties with some exceptions. 
In the case of doubts, as to rights in this zone, there is the legal presumption in favour of 
the sovereignty of the coastal state. 2 
An exception of the sovereignty tnat the coastal state enjoys there is the right of innocent 
passage for foreign ships through the territorial sea. This right is today well established in 
t'he international customary law3 and in the conventions for the Law of the Sea. 4 It has 
however long been disputed whether this right also applies to warships in the territorial 
seas. 
This thesis deals with the historical development of the· dispute, whether the right of inno-
cent passage is also applicable to the passage of foreign warships through the territorial 
sea of an another state. 
"The question of the passage of warships has been one of the most controversial 
issues in the international law since the establishment of the regime of innocent 
passage in the late 19th century. No agreement as to what is or should be-the legal 
rule has been in existence in the writings of the publicists. Nor has there been uni-
formity in state practice. It seems that both doctrine and state practice during the 
past 100 years have been dualistic rather than monistic. 5 -
Before I start with the real dissertation, it is the best to deal briefly, with the concepts of 
warship, passage and innocence. 
1 art. 2 of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). i 
2 Brown p. 20 ,.1 
3 Hall p. 198 ·/· 
4 art. 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (TSC), art. 17 LOSC 




The first question is what kind of vessel falls under the term "warship". 
Art. 29 LOSC defines a warship as a "ship belonging to the armed forces of a 
state bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under 
the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and 
whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned 
by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline." 
Before the emergence of this definition, the situation was not altogether clear . 
........ __ 
No direct definition of the term warship occurs in the official documents of the Hague 
Conference of 1930. An indirect reference can however be found in the Report of the 
~econd Committee on art. 4, which lay down right of innocent passage of vessels other 
than warships. "The expression vessels other than warships includes not only merchant 
vessels, but also vessels such as yachts, cable ships, etc., i(,.they are not vessels belonging 
to the naval forces of a State at the time of passage. "6 
From this time it was clear, that warships were vessels belonging to the naval forces of a 
state. 
This basis was further developed during the preparations for the 1958 Geneva Conference 
of the Law of the Sea. The International Law Commission (ILC) adopted at its seventh 
session in 1955 the following definition. "The term warship means a vessel belonging to 
the naval forces of a state, which is under regular naval discipline. "7 This definition is very 
similar to arts. 3 and 4 of the Convention on the Conversion of Merchantships into War-
ships adopted at the Hague Peace Conference 1907. Later at its eight session in 1956 the 
ILC adopted a supplement to the definition, that a warship must bear the external marks 
distinguishing warships of its nationality.8 This definition was included in the Convention 
on the High Seas (HSC)9. Art. 29 LOSC clears up possible doubts that this definition ap-
plies to the whole law of the sea. 
6 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification oflnternational Law, Report of the Second Commit-
tee (Territorial Sea), C.230.M.117.1930.V., p. 7 quoted by De Vri~S p. 32 
7 I.L.C. Yearbook 1955, Vol. II p 23(Art.7 para.2) quoted by De Vries p. 32 
8 De Vries p. 33 





Passage through the territorial sea is defined in art. 14 (2) and (3) of the TSC as: 
(2) Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose either of 
traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to internal, or 
of making for the high seas from internal waters. 
(3) Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are 
incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or by· 
distress. 
The definition in art. 18 of the LOSC is in principle similar, but with some additions. 
(1) Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of a) trav-
ersing that sea withollt entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port 
facility outside internal waters; or b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a 
call at such roadstead or port facility. 
(2) Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes 
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary 
navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the pur-
pose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress. 
The provisions that passage shall be continuous and expeditious is added. Roadsteads and 
other port facilities outside internal waters, as for example deep water ports, are not dealt 
in the TSC. 
"Stopping and anchoring for other reasons may be lawful, but may cause1·the stay in the 
territorial sea to cease to be part of the passage, so that the ship cannot claim the right of 
innocent passage any longer."10 
10 De Vries p. 34 
4 
1.2. Innocence 
There have been many attempts to define when passage is innocent and when not so. It is 
wise to think of the following warning by Sir Gerald Fritzmaurice: "Innocent passage is 
one of the those concepts easy to ·understand, and not too difficult to apply in the concrete 
case, but liable to give rise to difficulties as soon as attempts are made to define them in 
precise terms." 11 
Art. 3 of the Final Act of the 1930 Hague Codification Conference provided: "Passage is 
not innocent when_ a vessel makes use of the_ territorial sea of a Coastal State for the pur-
pose of doing any act prejudicial to the public policy or the fiscal interests of that state." 
In the observations on art. 3 it was added, "that the passage ceases to be innocent if the 
right accorded by international law and defined in the present Convention is abused and in 
; that event the Coastal State resumes its liberty of action." 12 This statement indirectly de-
scribes innocent passage. 
The ILC proposed in 1958 the following definition. "Passage is innocent so long as the 
vessel does not use the territorial sea for committing any acts prejudicial to the security of 
the coastal State or contrary to the present rules or to other rules of international law."13 
The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea changed this proposal and adopted a 
modified definition of innocent passage. 
"Passage is innocent so long as it not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of 
the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with these ~icles and with 
other rules of international law. 14 The definition of innocence in art. 19 LOSC is similar: 
There however the siµrilarity between the two Conventions ends. Art. 19(2) of LOSC 
goes on to specify what is meant by prejudicial in this context with the enumeration of ex-
amples. 
11 Fritzmaurice, Some results ... p. 92 
12 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International Law, Report of the Second Commit-
tee (Territorial Sea) C.230.Mll7.1930.V., p.7. quoted by De Vries p. 35 
13 ILC Yearbook 1956 Vol. II, p. 258 quoted by De Vries p. 35 
14 art. 14 (4) TSC 
l 
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The TSC gave only one example of non innocent passage. Art. 14(5) TSC states: 
"Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be considered innocent if they do not observe 
such law and regulations as the coastal State may make and publish in order to prevent 
these vessels from fishing in the territorial sea." The examples of non innocent in art. 19(2) 
LOSC are more various and precise. 
I shall proceed to a historic analysis of the dispute concerning warships and innocent pas-
sage. 
2. Innocent Passage of Warships 
., / 
2.1. Historical Background 
The right of innocent passage through the territorial sea for foreign ships is connected 
with the development of the concept that the coastal state exercises sovereign rights in the 
waters adjacent to the shore. The first writer who promoted such an idea of innocent pas-
... 
sage for foreign vessels was Vattel in 1758. He declared that "ships of all states enjoy a 
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea". 15 This opinion of Vattel was not the 
general view of his contemporaries and immediate successors. 
The 17th and 18th centuries was the time, when writers argued about tli.e nature of the 
territorial sea, property theory against sovereignty theory. 
The concept of innocent passage was more incompatible with the sovereignty theory. The 
concept at this time was not well defined right and the concepts of innocent passage and 
coastal sovereignty developed in parallel, each helping to mould the other. 16 
15 Vattel in Le droit des gens (1758), quoted by Churchill and Lowe p. 60 
16 Churchill and Lowe p. 61 
6 
The Spanish colonial rights in the 17th/18th centuries show that the property theory was 
prevalent at this time. 
''The Spanish Empire, especially the colonies in Middle and South America were 
in principle closed for foreign shipping. Spanish colonial coast guards were under 
instructions to prevent foreign ships from approaching Spanish colonial ports. 
Commercial trade with the Spanish colonies was forbidden, except for Spanish 
ships."17 "Spain claimed the exclusive right of navigation in the western portion of 
the Atlantic, in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Pacific. Portugal as.sumed a similar 
right in the Atlantic south of Morocco and in the Indian Ocean.18 
Under these circumstances there was no demand for passage rights, because free trade 
was impossible (except in European waters). One fifth of the world and nearly all com-
mercially interesting overseas areas in this time were Spanish. From a navigational point of 
view, there was no demand for a passage right near the shore. The 18th century was the 
; golden era for sailing navigation. Sailing ships kept naturally their distance from the shore 
unless making port. They avoided sailing close to the shore, because of the existence of 
cliffs and reefs. This situation changed in the first half of the 19th century. 
As a result of the revolt in the Spanish American Empire most of the South American 
colonies became independent.· This was the end of the prohibition on trade with territories 
outside Europe. In these circumstances it was natural that the emphasis changed from 
protection of the shore to promotion of commerce with foreign countries. 19 
Also as a result of the technical development, navigation started to take,_place more and· 
more with steamships than with sailing vessels. Steamships were not depended on wind 
and currents. They c~uld take the shortest route between points, and could also use 
coastal waters when convenient. 20 
17 O'Connell p. 262 
18 Fulton p. 4 
19 O'Connell p. 263 




The first author to reflect this change was Masse in 1844. He argued that "rights of the 
coastal state did not extend to interfere with commercial navigation, because it possessed 
only jurisdiction, not property in the territorial sea. "21 
Since the middle of the 19. century the right of innocent passage has been well established 
in the practice of states. 22 
2.2. Developm·ents up to World War I . 
2 .. 2.1. State practice 
The history of the dispute, whether warships enjoys a righ~,, of innocent passage or not is 
old. It became acute after the establishment of the right of innocent passage. Obviously 
before this period no distinction between warships and merchant ships was drawn. 23 
There were some treaties between states that regulated for example the number of foreign 
· · warships entitled to enter a port (ordinary six vessels).24 These treaties are for example the · 
treaties between France and Denmark of 1662, 1678, 1697, 1713 and 1739.25 The treaties 
did not deal explicitly with passage rights through coastal waters of the parties. They pro-
vided that warships of both monarchs should have a right to enter harbours, rivers, port 
and ride at anchor. Numerical limits were for example fixed in the treaty df 1748 between 
Denmark and the two the two Sicilies and in the treaties of 1767 and 1801 between Russia ' 
and Sweden. 26 ,. 
Before the establishment of the right of innocent passage, the main argument against pas-
sage rights of warships was that they would threaten the security of the coastal state. 
21 Masse. G., Le droit commercial clans ses rapports avec le droit des gens (1844), quoted by O'Connell p. 
263 
22 Hall p. 198 
23 O'Connell p. 275 
24 ibid. p. 275 
25 ibid. p. 275 
26 ibid. p. 275 
l 
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"In 1807 the United States closed its waters after HMS Leopard fired into USS 
Chesapeake which resisted search for British deserters. This precedent was relied 
upon by Wharton for his statement that the admission of warships within territo-
rial waters might be refused on due cause. "27 
Strictly speaking this case was not a case of a passage of a foreign warship through terri-
torial waters, consequently it cannot be a precedent case against a passage right of war-
ships. The opinion of Wharton shows, however that the former threat argument. against 
the passage of all ships in territorial waters now became an argument against the passage 
of warships in these waters._The state practice on innocent passage of warships before 
World War I was not uniform. The reasons for this are mentioned above. In the property 
period of the territorial sea the right to exclude all foreign shipping was conceded to the 
coastal state, which might tolerate foreign shipping as a matter of practice, without being 
.-
required to do so. Also as mentioned above, warship fleets in former times were mostly 
; 
sailing fleets. These fleets preferred rather to sail in deep waters than near the shore. Iron-
clad warships became established with the technological revolution in naval construction28 
and were used for the first time in the American Civil War 1861-1865. For warships it was 
now possible to navigate independently of current and wind and also, if convenient, near 
the shore. 
The first sharp distinction between passage right of warships and other vessels was drawn 
during the Danish War 1850, when Lubeck issued a neutrality decree closing its territorial 
sea to warships of all belligerents.29 The next step was the Paris Treaty of..30 March 1856 · 
closing the Black Sea to the warships of all nations. 30 This, like the Treaty of Berlin of the 
13 July 1878, embodying the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, declared that the waters 
of Montenegro should be closed to the warships of all nations31, were only contrived po-
litical compromises and indicated no general principle. 32 
27 ibid. p. 262 
28 ibid. p .275 
29 Voigt (1937), 49 quoted by O'Connell p.277 
30 46 BFSP 13, Art.11 quoted by O'Connell p. 277, later this decision was chanceled. Parties to this treaty 
were Russia, Prussia, Austria, England, France, and the Ottoman Empire 
31 69 BFSP 749, Art.29 quoted by O'Connell p. 277 
32 O'Connell p. 277 
i 
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The next big step in the development of this dispute was a statement made by an official 
agent of the United States of America in 1910. Elihu Root33 pleaded for the USA against 
Great Britain in the hearings of the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration at the Hague Tri-
bunal. He said: 
"These vague and unfounded claims (of the England, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Portugal in the 18th, 17th, and earlier centuries in regard to the territorial sea) dis-
appeared entirely, and there was nothing of them left ... The sea became, in general, 
as free internationally as it was under the Roman law. However the new principle 
of freedom, when it approached the shore, met with another principle, the principle 
of protec;ti.~>n, not a residuum of the old claim, but a new independent basis and 
reason for modification, near the shore, of the principle of freedom. The sovereign 
of the land washed by the sea asserted a new right to protect his subjects and citi-
zens against attack, against invasion, against interference and injury, to protect 
them against attack threatening their peace, to protect their revenues, to protect 
their health, to protect their industries. This is the basis and the sole basis on 
which is established the territorial zone that is recognised in the international law 
of today. Warships may not pass, without consent in this zone, because they 
threaten. Merchantships may pass and repass because they do not threaten. "34 
This is a famous argument against a passage right for warships. The opponents of such a 
right still use this argument. It is based on the presumption of the sovereignty of the 
coastal state to the waters near the shore. These waters near the shore, the territorial wa-
ters, were for Elihu Root in the first place a protective area. From such a point of view 
warships should not be in this zone. Only merchant ships are allowed to navigate, because 
they serve the commerce, and consequently the welfare, of the coastal state. The question 
now is, whether this attitude of the United States at the beginning of this century indicates 
the general attitude of all states at the time. O'Connell writes: "At this time this was 
scarcely more than an expression of opinion, since there was so little State practice to 
support a doctrinaire stand one way or the other, beyond the unquestionable fact that war-
ships regularly made transits by the shortest routes."35 Unanimity between states showed 
the Hague Peace Conference in 1910. The question of warships arose at the international 
33 Elihu Root was United States Secretary of State between July 1, 1905 and January 27, 1909. The Court 
of Arbitration delivered its award on September 7, 1910. 
34 Argument of Elihu Root in XI Proceedings, North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, p. 2006 quoted by 
Jessup p. 5 [Italic added] 
35 O'Connell p. 277 
level in connection with the law of neutrality. If there was a right of passage for belliger-
ents warships in neutral waters in time of war, a fortiori there must be a general right of 
passage in time of peace. There were differences of opinion in regard to the right of inno-
cent passage of warships through the territorial sea of a state and discussions occurred on 
mines and the rights and duties of neutral powers in maritime war, showed that there was 
no agreement among states on this important subject. 36 The Protocol of the Conference 
shows the dispute between the different states. "It seems to indicate an agreement that a 
neutral State could forbid passage in limited parts of its territorial waters to the extent that 
this would appear necessary for the maintenance of its neutrality."37 Art. 32 of the English 
~~ ... ' 
draft provided for an unlimited right of passage, but this was not adopted. The limitation 
that only parts of the territorial sea could be closed does not seem to have been generally 
accepted. 38 
At the beginning of the First World War some states declared themselves as neutral. Art. 4 
of the Netherlands Neutrality Declaration provided that the.presence of any warship would 
not be tolerated within the jurisdiction of the state. The Dutch government took the view 
that even mere passage of warships could be forbidden. 39 
The non-uniform state practice at the time is showed by a report of the United States 
Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence published in 1916. It is called 'Regulations governing 
••• . ·'-> 
the visits of men-of-war to foreign ports'.40 This report does not deal in he first place with 
the passage right of warships. It deals, as the title suggests with the right of visit of war-
ships to foreign ports. However to go to a port a warship has to traverse the territorial sea 
'· too. It is right to say a right of visit to a foreign port of men-of-war does not imply auto-
matically a passage right. However such a right of visit might indicate a right of innocent 
passage in the territorial sea for warships. The whole report contains the attitude of 44 
states and their colonies to this topic. It' indicates that in 1916 warships were permitted 
entry, subject to observance of regulations, into the ports of twenty-nine countries. The 
36 ibid. p. 277 
37 Actes et documents, Vol. I, 304 quoted by O'Connell p. 277 
38 110 BFSP 928 quoted by O'Connell p. 278 
39 O'Connell p. 278 




rest of the countries did not have any restrictions for the visit of foreign men-of-war in 
ports at all. These countries were: the Argentine Republic, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Salvador, 
Santo Domingo, Uruguay and Venezuela. The reason for non regulation in Latin Ameri-
can states was probably non involvement in military operation in World War I. Examples 
of the twenty-nine countries which permitted entry, subject to the observance of regula-
tions were Spain ("give notice as a customary rule through diplomatic channels") and 
Greece ("as a matter of courtesy through diplomatic channels"). Three of the twenty-nine 
countries expres~~~ allowed passage (not only a right of visit) and anchoring in territorial 
waters. They were Denmark, Belgium and France. The Danish Decree of 15 January 1913 
read as follows: 
Art. I Warships of all foreign nations are allowed without previous notice, to navi-
gate Danish waters and anchor in the same with the exception of the inland waters, 
the harbour of Copenhagen and closed waters.41 ., 
The Belgian Decree of the 18 February 1901 read as follows: 
Art. 3 ... Foreign men-of-war, unless specially authorised by the government, may 
not remain longer than two weeks in the Belgian territorial waters and harbours. 
They are required to put to sea within six hours when requested to do so by the 
navy administration or the military authorities, even if the time fixed for their stays 
have not expired. 
In the case of belligerent warships, the situation was modified. 
Art. 19 Should men-of-war ( or merchant vessels) of two nations in a state of war 
happen to be at the same time in Belgian waters, there shall occur an interval of at 
least 24 hours, fixed by the competent authorities, between the departure of a ves-
sel of one of the belligerent and the subsequent departure of a vessel of the other 
belligerent. 42 
41 ibid. p. 129 
42 ibid. p. 127 
12 
The French provisions in the time of Peace (Decree of 21 May 1913) and War (Decree of 
the 26 May 1913) are similar to the Belgian provisions. 
In Time of Peace 
Art. 3 In time of peace foreign men-of-war are permanently authorised to visit the 
French ports and those of the protectorates and to anchor in the territorial wa-
ters ... Foreign men-of-war cannot remain over 15 days in the ports and territorial 
waters. They shall go to sea within 6 hours should they be so requested by the na-
val authorities or by the commandants d'armes, even in case the delay fixed for 
ii their stay may not have expired. 
; 
In Time of War 
Art. 2 No foreign men-of-war may approach, without exposure t<? destruction, the 
shores of French territorial waters nearer than 3 nautical miles, without having 
been authorised to do so.43 
In Time of War and France is neutral 
Should France be neutral, belligerent warships might remain in French territorial 
waters, which in this case would be ten nautical miles from the coast or a ten mile 
closing line in bays, for only seventy-two hours.44 
The regulations of France and Belgium do not mention expressly a passage right. How-
ever they speak about staying in the territorial waters and staying also includes passage 
through them. Accordingly these countries allowed unconditional innoc~nt passage of 
warships through their territorial waters without conditions. 
Also interesting are the regulations of Brazil and Norway on this topic. Brazil's regula-
tions read as follows: 
There are no restrictions as to the number of men-of-war under one flag that may 
visit any port at any time, nor as to the duration of such visit. There are no closed 
ports in this country. Foreign men-of-war are not permitted to carry on target 
practice with guns or torpedo practice in the territorial waters of Brazil. 45 
43 ibid. p. 138 
44 Decree of 18 October 1912 10 AJIL (1916), p. 138; art. 1 quoted by O'Connell p. 279 




The Norwegian regulations in regard to naval exercise were similar. "Art. 6 ... Landing ex-
ercises and target practice with guns, small arms, or torpedoes may not be carried out. "46 
Only the Romanian decree of the 22 November 1912 expressly required previous notice 
for voyages through the territorial waters ( also for visits to ports as in the case most of 
other states). "Article 1. It is forbidden to foreign warships to enter Romanian ports or to 
cruise in Romanian waters without notice having previously been given through diplomatic 
channels."47 Romania was the first state to forbid passage in territorial waters expressly 
(most other states only regulated entry into ports). It was also the first state which re-
quired previous notification should such a passage take place. -~-~, 
2.2.2. Attempts at Codification up to World War I 
Since the second half of the 19th Century we find attempts°'to codify the international law 
of the sea. The first attempts were made by non-governmental organisations such as the 
International Law Association, founded in 1873, and the Institute of International Law -
Institut de Droit International- also founded in 1873. 
/ In 1894 the Institute of International Law adopted rules on the definition and regime of 
the territorial sea. Art 5 read as follows: 
"All ships without distinction have a right of innocent passage through the territo-
rial sea, saving to belligerents the right of regulating such passage, and, for the 
purpose of defence, of forbidding it to any ship, and saving to neutrals the right of 
regulating the passage of ships of war of all nationalities through the said sea. 
(T ous les navires sans distinction ont le droit de passage inoffensif par la mer terri-
'al ) ,,48 ton e .... 
This seems to grant the right of innocent passage to all ships (merchant and warships). 
This however is not quite clear, because Art. 9 declared "The peculiar situation of ships of 
46 10 AJIL (1916), p. 165 
47 10 AJIL (1916), p. 169 
48 Jessup p. 462 
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war and the ships assimilated to them is reserved. (Est reservee la situation particuliere des 
navires de guerre et de ceux qui leur sont assimiles. )"49 
The International Law Association also adopted rules of the law of the sea in 1895. They 
were very similar to the rules of the International Law Institute with some modifications. 50 
/ 2.2.3. Conclusion 
State practice up to the First World War on innocent passage of foreign warships in terri-
torial waters was-not uniform. Only Denmark expressly allowed navigation in its territorial 
waters without previous notice. Romania, by way of contrast to Denmark, forbade cruis-
ing in Romanian waters without previous notice. Other states did not deal in particular in 
their legislation with passage rights of warships. They only regulated access of foreign 
,, warships to ports, which was sometimes tied to previous notification. Other states such as 
the Latin American states, did not limit access rights to ports or transit rights of foreign 
warships in territorial waters at all. That is why there must be a presumption that in these 
Latin American states, the right of innocent passage was equally enjoyed by warships and 
merchant vessels. Whether the situation was the same in states which only regulated ac-
cess to ports is uncertain and doubtful. 
Up to World War I attempts to codify the international law on this topic did not show a 






2.3. Juristic Opinions 
2.3.1. The classical writers 
The classical writers in international law as Grotius51 and Selden52 did not mention this 
topic, for the reasons. mentioned above. 53 The treatises dealt more the trade with overseas 
territories, rather than a sophisticated survey of the right of innocent passage of warships 
in the territorial sea of another state. The classical writers of the 18th century Bynker-
shoek54 and Vattei55 did not deal with this topic either.l Vattel.-demanded that ships of all ~ 
nations should enjoy a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 56 He did not 
distinguish between warships and merchant ships. He only declared the existence of such a 
,•. 
passage right. 
2.3.2. The writers of the 19th century 
The first author who distinguished between merchantships and warships was Masse the 
innovator of the right of innocent passage. For him, the foundation of the right was com-
mercial traffic and so did it not apply to warships. 57 None of Masse's immediate succes-
sors who forged the doctrine of innocent passage followed him in this distinction, and 
there was very little nineteenth century governmental practice by reference to which the · 
'· 
distinction could be tested. 58 Masse's point was first elaborated by Hall in 1880 in a pas-
sage which has often been relied upon by governments. 59 He confirmed the existence of 
the right of innocent p~ssage (he described this as innocent use)E said: \ 1,\ \~ 
51 Mare Liberum (1608) 
52 Mare Clausum (1635) 
53 It was the area of sailing ships which avoided navigating close to the shore. 
54 De domino marls dissertatio (1702) 
55 Le droit des gens (1758) 
56 Vattel in Le Droit de gens (1758) quoted by Churchill and Lowe p. 60 
57 Masse, G. Le droit commercial dans ses rapports avec le droit gens (1844) p. 112 quoted by O'Connell 
p.275 
58 O'Connell p. 275 
59 ibid. p. 275 
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"In all cases in which territorial waters are so placed that passage over them is ei-
ther necessary or convenient for the navigation of open seas, as in that of marginal 
waters, or of an appropriated strait connecting unappropriated waters, they are 
subject to a right of innocent use by all mankind for the purposes of commercial 
navigation. For more than two hundred and fifty years no European territorial 
water which could be used as a thoroughfare or into which vessels could acciden-
tally stray or be driven, have been closed to commercial navigation; and since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century no such waters have been closed in any part of 
the civilised world. The right must be considered to be established in the most 
complete manner. This right of innocent passage does not extend to vessels of 
war.',60 
Masse and Hall were the first writers who refused a passage right for warships. Innocent 
passage was for them a limitation of the sovereignty of the coastal state. Limitations of 
sovereignty should be restricted to very few cases, for example if it would be to the advan-
t.age of the coastal state. bnly commerce and not _naval traffic was in Hall's opinion an ad-
vantage for the coastal state. 
Its possession by them could not be explained upon the ground by which commer-
cial passage is justified. The interests of the whole world are concerned in the pos-
session of the utmost liberty of navigation for the purposes of trade by the vessels 
of all states. But no general interests are necessarily or commonly involved in the 
possession by a state of a right to navigate the waters of other s,tates with its ·ships 
of war. Such a privilege is to the advantage only of the individual state; it may of-
ten be injurious to third states; and it may sometimes be dangerous to the proprie-
tor of the water used. A state has therefore always the right to refuse access to its 
territorial waters to the armed vessels of other states, ifhe wishes to do so.',61 
'· 
This reflects Hall's opinion that if there is a passage right for warships, it is only in the dis-
cretion of the coastal state. His view, however were not widely supported by his contem-
poraries at the end of the 19th century. 
60 Hall p. 197, [italics added] 




2.3.3. Juristic opinion supporting the right 
Many writers did not follow Hall in his opinion on this topic. Westlake expressly dissented 
from Hall's view. He said: 
" ... But a ship of war as well as a merchantman may have a lawful errand beyond 
the littoral sea in question ... In the course of its lawful voyage it may be difficult 
for it to avoid the littoral sea, especially if the width of the latter should receive. 
any general extension. And the possession by the littoral sovereign of a right to 
interrupt the voyage would expose him, if neutral, to the most inconvenient de-
mands from belligerents for his exercise. of that right, while his_ own safety is suf-
ficiently provided for by the authority to regulate which article 5 of the Institute62 
reserves to him. It would be a very different matter for ships of war to take up 
even a temporary station in foreign, though friendly, territorial waters, and except 
under stress of weather they do not in fact do so without previously obtaining 
permission. ',63 
This opinion pro a right of innocent passage of warships tontains two remarkable argu-
ments. First, that the old 3 mile rule was not made for ever in the law of the sea and sec-
ond the counter argument against the statement of Elihu Root64, that the coastal state has 
many remedies to protect itself against threats, from warships in innocent passage. 65 
Perels also favoured innocent passage for warships. 66 The next author who asserted this 
was Lawrence in 1895. He wrote: "It extends to vessels of war as well to merchant ves-
sels. "67 It seems that he limited the innocent passage in general to channels of communica-
tion between two portions of high seas, because he defined innocent passage " ... as the 
'· 
right of free passage through the territorial waters of friendly states when they form a 
channel of communication between two portions of the high seas. "68 He continued : 
, 
62 Art. 5 of the draft of the Institute of International Law for the codification of the law of the sea 
63 Westlake p. 196 
64 in the hearings at the North Atlantic Fishery Arbitration 1910, XI Proceedings, North Atlantic Fisher-
ies Arbitration, p. 2006 
65 The coastal sovereign could well protect itself from abuse, as is recognized by art. 5 of the draft resolu-
tion of the Institute of International Law. 
66 Perels, F. P. Das intemationale oeffentliche Seerecht der Gegenwart (1882) p. 103 quoted by O'Connell 
p.276 
67 Lawrence p. 195 
68 ibid. p. 194 
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"This right thus created is, of course, confined to vessels of states at peace with 
the territorial power, and is conditional upon the observance of reasonable regula-
tions and the performance of no unlawful acts. It extends to vessels of war as well 
as to merchant vessels. No power can prevent their passage through its straits 
from the sea to sea, even though their errand is to seek and attack the vessels of 
their foe, or to blockade or bombard his ports.',69 
However the next sentence in this section on innocent passage, shows there is no limita-
tion of the right of innocent passage of warships ( and other ships as well) for straits only. 
He wrote: "As long as they commit no hostile acts in territorial waters, or near the them as 
to endanger the peace and the security of those within them, their passage is perfectly in-
nocent." 70 Lawrence continued with what is in my opinion the most efficient argument in 
favour a right of innocent passage of warships and said: "The word as used in the phrase 
,•, 
'right of innocent passage', refers to the character of the passage not to the nature of the 
ship."71 Other authors at this time followed this way. Taylor,.affirmed the right in 190172 as 
did Politis73, while Rivier implied it. 74 Schiiking emphasised in 1897 that no distinction was 
possible between warships and merchantships with regard to innocent passage 75 . Despag-
net 76 in effect adopted the resolutions of the Institute of International Law on both 
points77. Hastschek for example declares that the primary object is "to allow the innocent 
passage to foreign ships, including warships."78 This opinion that there is no difference 
with regard to the innocent passage of warships is also held by Ross. 79 Verdross adhered 
to the view that the right is shared with merchant ships equally. He said: "Dieses Recht 
6
·
9 ibid. p. 195 
70 ibid. p. 196 
71 ibid. p. 196 
72 Taylor, H., A Treatisie on Public Law (1901) quoted by O'Connell p.276 
73 8 RGDIP (1901), p. 281 quoted by O'Connell p.276 
74 Rivier, A., Principes du droit des gens, 2 vols (1896) quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
75 Schiiking, W., Das Kiistenmeer im Intemationalen Recht (1897) p. 31 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
76 Despagnet, F., Cours de droit international public (18Q4) p. 610 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
77 art. 5 and art. 9 of the Resolutions of the Institute oflntemational Law 1895 see above 
78 Hastschek, J., An Outline oflntemational Law (1930) [English Translation] p. 138 quoted by Shao Jin 
p.62 
79 Ross, A., A textbook of International Law (1947) [English Translation] p.177 quoted by Shao Jin p. 62 
19 
wird regelmassig auch fremden Kriegsschiffen eingeraumt". 80 This view is also shared by 
Hyde. He said: 
v/ 
"Over its territorial waters along the marginal sea the control of the territorial sov-
ereign is limited While it may regulate at will matters pertaining to fisheries, the 
enjoyment of the underlying land, coastal trade, police and pilotage, the use of 
particular channels, as well as maritime ceremonial, it is not pennitted to debar 
foreign merchant vessels from the enjoyment of what is known as the right of 
'innocent passage'.\. Vessels of war, although serving no commercial purpose, are 
not necessarily deprived of the right of passage under normal conditions, and still 
less, other public ships devoted to scientific purposes. So long as the conduct of a 
vessel of any kind is not essentially injurious to the safety and welfare of the litto-
ral State,-·there would appear to be no reason to exclude it from the use of the 
marginal sea .... In a word, the right of so called innocent passage vanishes when-
ever the conduct of a ship is hannful to the territorial sovereign. To the latter, 
whether a belligerent or a neutral, must be accorded the right to determine when 
acts of a passing ship lose their innocent character. "81 
This view shows also the attitude that there should be no difference in the treatment of .,.. 
warships and merchant vessels. There is also the counter argument against Elihu Root, 
that warships are not dangerous for the coastal state in general, because international law 
concedes the coastal state enough possibilities to protect itself in time of danger or war. 82 
Other authors such as Strupp83 and Frenzel84 generally affirmed the right. Liszt, a German 
author affirmed the right and includes in it passage in time of war. He wrote in 1895: 
Die Durchfahrt durch die Kiistengewasser darf den Handels- wie den Kriegs-
schiffen fremder Staaten in Friedens - wie in Kriegszeiten weder versagt noch von 
\ 
Abgaben abhangig gemacht werden ( de droit passage inoffensif, juis passagii sive 
transitus inoxii). Die friedliche Durchfahrt durch die Kiistengewasser fiir fremde 
Kriegsschiffe steht in der Regel frei, im Falle der Seenot auch das Anlaufen von 
Hafen.85 
80 Verdross p. 274 
81 Hyde, C.C., International Law (1922) p. 277-278 quoted by Hackworth p. 646 
82 for example the cancellation of innocent passage for all ships 
83 Strupp, K., Das Kiistenmeer im Volkerrecht der Gegenwart und Zukunft (1929) p. 71 quoted by 
O'Connell p. 276 
84 Frenzel, G., Theorien iiber die rechltliche Natur des Kiistenmeeres (1908) p. 18 quoted by O'Connell p. 
276 
85 Liszt p. 144, 182 
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Reuter said that the right was shared with merchant ships equally. He wrote: "La Conven-
tion precitee admet la liberte de passage pour tous les navires, meme les navires de guerre; 
pour ces dernis, celle-ci a ete discutee sur le plan coutumier."86 This view is also adhered 
by Longo87 and Cavere88 
2.3.4. Juristic opinion against the right of innocent passage for warships 
There were also ·many authors, who denied the right of innocent passage of warships and 
followed Halls opinion. Jessup said: 
" ... that as a general principle the right of innocent passage requires no supporting 
argument, it is finnly established in international law. there is however, a diver-
gence of opinion on two points, first, whether war vessels may exercise this right; 
second, ... As to warships the sound rule seems to be that"they should not enjoy an 
absolute legal right to pass through a states territorial waters any more than an 
army may cross the land territory."89 
He carried on and citing the statements of Elihu Root and William Edward Hall in support. 
Jessup's comparison of land territory and sea sounds logical. However it does not con-
sider the possible necessity of passage rights for navigational purposes. There is no similar 
necessity for a army on land as for the navigation of a warship near the shore because 
there is no terra nullius anymore the territorial sea which could serve as something like -
'· 
the high seas. Sometimes it is also difficult to avoid or it is much more convenient to use 
it. 
Svarlerie also concedes: 
"that the question, whether warships or other public vessels have a right to inno- Co"----C)..I'-" 
cent passage through the territorial waters subject to the authority of the littoral 
state cannot be definitively answered at the present time, as considerable disa-
86 Reuter p. 210 
87 Longo, C., Diritto Internazionale Publico (1905) p. 109 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
88 Cavere, L., Le Droit International public positif (1967) p. 506 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
89 Jessup p. 120 
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greement is found among jurists and publicists .... warships do not enjoy a legal 
right to innocent passage under the law of nations. "90 
He also cites meanings of Elihu Root and Hall in support. Tan Tsu-hung 91and Keilin and 
Vinogradov 92 write similar. 
2.3.5. Ambivalent juristic opinion 
This school confains many writers showing. sometimes a tendency to views which admit 
the right and sometimes views which denied it. Oppenheim is an example. He stated: 
/.that a right for the men-of-war of foreign States to pass ~red through the 
maritime belt is not generally recognised. It may safely be stated, first, that a us-
age has grown up by which such passage, if in every w~ inoffensive and without 
danger, shall not be denied in time of peace; ... "93 · · · 
Oppenheim's view is similar to the view, that there is a right of innocent passage for war-
ships.94 
Dahm would allow prohibition or conditional passage under certain circumstances and he 
I 
admitted the question was controversial. He said: 
Ob Kriegsschiffe ein Durchfahrtsrecht haben, ist lebhaft umstritten. . .. Es treffen 
die Erwagungen, auf denen das Recht der Durchfahrt beruht, namebtlich das 
Bedurfuis nach einer Rucksichtnahme auf den Handel und Verkehr nicht auf 
Kriegsschiffe zu. Diese sind auch der Jurisdiktion des Kustenstaates entzogen, und 
sie konnen eine .. Gefahr fiir die Sicherheit bilden. Sofem keine Vertrage bestehen 
mochten wir meinen, darf der Staat die Durchfahrt fremder Kriegsschiffe durch 
seine Kustengewasser verbieten, sie von Bestimmungen abhangig machen und ihre 
Durchfahrt im einzelnen regeln. Allenfalls lasst sich erwagen, ob nicht Kriegs-
90 Svalerien p. 195 
91 Tan Tsu-hung, Principles of Public International Law (1922) [in Chinese] p. 110 quoted by Shao Jin p. 
62 
92 Keilin and Vinogradov, Law of the Sea (1939) [in Russian] p.115 quoted by Shao Jin p. 62 
93 Oppenheim p. 494 
94 see for example Westlake's opinion at footnote number 62 
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schiffen die Durchfahrt insoweit gewahrt werden muss, als daran ein intemation-
ales Interesse besteht. "95 
He argues, as Hall, that the necessity for a passage right is to support commerce and 
therefore does not apply to warships. He further argues that warships of other states are 
not under the jurisdiction of the coastal state and because of that they could be a threat. 
The conclusion of Dahm is that the coastal state can prohibit passage or grant the it sub-
ject to conditions. He is also of the view that there might be a right of innocent passage for 
ti warships where an international interest is involved. 
Bustamante y Sirv~n seems to envisage prior_authorisation. He says: 
"Il importe en outre d'etablir, au point de vue du transit et de sa reglementation, 
une difference entre les navires, suivant l'usage auquel ils sont destines. Les navi-
res de commerce et ceux qui sont susceptibles de propriete privee en general, n'ont 
pas d'autres restrictions que celles fondees sur sur le principe anterieurement ex-
pose, et en dehors d'elles ont la liberte de croiser ou non. Tandis que les navires de 
guerre, qui en principe ne doivent passer par les eaux territoriales etrangeres que 
quand le pays auquel ils appartiennent entretient des relations diplomatiques avec 
l'Etat souverain de ces eaux, ont a obeir de meme a toutes les prescriptions specia-
les etablies pour eux. Parmi celles-ci peuvent figurer la necessite d'une permission 
de l 'autorite competente, la prohibition de visiter certaines zones, la limitation du 
nombre de ceux · qui passent en meme navire de recommender son voyage sans 
qu'il y ait certains intervalles, et toutes autres que la securite nationale impose ou 
requiert. "96 
Kelsen seems Jo limit the passage of warships to where it a is necessary for navigation. He 
states: 
"The territorial waters (maritime belt) legally belong to the territory of the littoral 
States, but the fatter are here, according to international law, subjected to certain 
restrictions. The most important restriction is this: the littoral State is obliged, in 
time of peace, to allow the merchantmen of every other State to pass inoffensively 
through its territorial waters. As far as foreign men-of-war are concerned it is as-
sumed that the right of passage through such parts of the maritime belt as form 
parts of the highways for international traffic cannot be denied. "97 
95 Dahm p.647 
96 Bustamante y Sirven p. 206 
97 Kelsen p. 211 
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Bonfils-Fauchille hold a relative point of view as well. He would allow the territorial state 
to forbid the passage through its territorial straits, 'saufle respect des convenances inter-
nationales', but adds "that passage through its territorial waters can only be forbidden in 
time of war and if the territorial power is belligerent. "98 F auchille said in another publica-
tion: 
"Un droit de passage innocent existe indistinctement au profit de tous les bati-
ments etrangers, marchands ou militaires, clans la partie territoriale des detroits qui 
ii joignent deux mers libres, mais non clans celle des detroits qui unissent une mer 
libre a une mer fermee : clans ces derniers detroits les navires de commerce seuls 
peuvent pretendre a un passage innocent"99 
He rejects the opinion that the right of innocent passage be reserved to trade. In this re-
spect there is no difference between merchant and warships:" ... s'il existe ainsi un droit de 
i passage innocent au profit des navires etrangers, il n'y a pas de motifs pour ne pas en faire 
beneficier les navires de guerre aussi bien que les navires de"commerce." 100 
Colombos also supports a similar point of view, as all the opinions in this mixed group. He 
said: 
J 
"As regard men-of-war, the question is controversial whether they enjoy the same 
right of innocent passage. The better view appears to be that such use should not 
be denied in time of peace when the territorial waters are so placed that the pas-
sage through them is necessary for the international traffic. "101 
Gidel wrote: 
"Le passage des batiments de guerre etrangers dans la mer territoriale n' est un 
droit mais une tolerance c' est l' opinion qui semble preferable. Elle est davantage 
de nature a proteger certains Etats contre les abus auxquels ils pourraient etre ex-
poses du fait de voisins turbulents ou indiscrets. "102 
98 Bonfils-Fauchille $$ 517-18, $ 507 quoted by Hall p. 199 
99 Fauchille p, 254 
100 Fauchille p. 1005 
101 Colombos p. 114 
102 Gidel, C.G., Le droit international public de la mer Vol. 3 (1934) p. 284 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
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He seems to treat this question as one of tolerance rather than that of a right of innocent 
passage for warships. He continuos "that the state of customary law was difficult to define 
because States regularly accord passage to foreign warships, but with the reservation of 
the right, not only to regulate but even to forbid this passage."103 
Smith wrote in 1959 that "there is no legal right of passage, although its prohibition would 
be an unfriendly act." 104 Spiropoulos stated in 1933 "that a right of innocent passage for 
warships could be denied in exceptional circumstances."105 Cavaglieri said the exercise of 
this right was subject to previous authorisation106, although elsewhere he said that war-
ships benefited from the presumption of innocence. 107 His opinion is similar to that of ~- . 
Bustamante y Sirven. 108 Podesta Costa said that it was a matter of comity, though never 
denied. 109 De Lauter restricted the right to necessary access routes. 110 Mercker would 
limit the number of warships and regulate their passage to insure they were not a threat, 
but he said that in peace time in practice the passage of warships is generally permitted 
without restriction. 111 This view is partly similar to the view-of Colombos and Oppenheim. 
The difference is that the number of warships should be regulated. Bjorksten also followed 
Oppenheims qualified opinion. 112 Sibert thought it is difficult to say when the passage of 
warships is innocent. 113 
103 Gide!, C.G., Le droit international public de la mer Vol. 3 (1934) p. 279 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
104 Smith, H.A., The Law and the customs of the sea ( 1959) p. 48 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
105 Spiropoulos, J., Traite theoretique et pratique du droit international public (1933) p. 117 quoted by 
O'Connell p. 276 
106 Corso di Diritto lnternazionale p. 260 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
107 in 26 Hague Recueil (1929) 444 quoted by O'Connell p.276 
108 see footnote number 95 
109 Podesta Costa, L.A., Derecho Internacional Publico (1955) p. 312 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
110 De Louter, J., Le droit internacional positifVol. 1 (1920) p. 430 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
111 Mercker, R, Das Ktistengewiisser im Volkerrecht (1927) p. 38 quoted by O'Connell p. 276 
112 Bjorksten, S.R, Das Wassergebiet Finnlands in volkerrechtlicher Hinsicht (1926) p. 105 quoted by 
O'Connell p. 276 
113 Sibert, M., Traite de droit international public Vol. 2 (1951) p. 275 qouted by O'Connell p. 276 
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2.3.6. Conclusions on the juristic opinion 
Since 1960 writers on the international law of the sea have not advanced new arguments 
in favour of a right of innocent passage of warships or against such a right. They rather 
repeat the old arguments of previous authors than devise new theories on the topic. 114 The 
reasons for this are found in the first codification of the law of the sea in 1958 and the 
different state practice between western countries and the communist block at the zenith 
•.•' 
of the cold war. "After UNCLOS I (1958) there seems to be a tendency in the writings of 
publicists to concentrate on the interpretation of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous z'one (1958). 115 
In conclusion the majority of writers more or less favour for a right of innocent passage 
f?r warships . in territorial waters. However different state practice and the non-uniform 
views of the authors are evidence against a customary embodying such a right. As Gidel 
put it: 
"Le passage des batiments des marines de guerre etrangeres dans la mer territoriale n' est 
pas un droit, mais une tolerance." 116 
2.4. Developments up to 1945 
2.4.1. State practice 
Between the World Wars, state practice was similar to before. There was a lack of uni-
formity amongst states in regard on the topic. Most national legislation on visiting foreign 
warships dealt only incidentally with the territorial sea as before World War I. 117 There is 
114 see for example Churchill and Lowe p. 74 
115 Shao Jin p. 62 
116 Gidel p. 284 quoted by Dahm p. 647 
117 O'Connell p. 279 
26 
for example the German Regulations of 1 September 1925 concerning the admission of 
foreign warships to ports and waters on the German coast ( which replaced those of the 
24 May 1910). They did not require formalities for entry into territorial waters, but speci-
fied that, if the commander of a foreign warship did not comply with German laws and 
regulations, the vessel might be required to leave. 118 A Belgian Royal Decree of 9 January 
1924 specified that previous notice of the sojourn of warships in Belgian territorial waters 
must be given through diplomatic channels and limited the length of the stay and the num-
ber of warships concerned. No mention was made of passage. The naval administration 
was authorised t? terminate the sojourn at any time. 119 Regulations made by Denmark on 
19 January 1927 specified that visiting warships were bound to observe Danish regula-
tions, and might be required to depart. 120 The Swedish Royal Notices of 1925 and 1928 on 
access of foreign warships did not deal with passage, but only with sojourn121 . Iran guar-
anteed in 1934 the right of innocent passage of foreign warships. 122 A Netherlands Decree 
of 2 June 1931 respecting warships with aircraft aboard st~ted that the limitations therein 
did not prevent free passage of warships through territorial waters in accordance with in-
ternational law. 123 The Italian Royal Decree of 24 August 1933 permitted free entry of 
and anchoring by foreign warships within six nautical miles of the low water mark, subject 
to restrictions on numbers of ships and an eight day limit. But in the interests of national 
defence, they might be prohibited from passing through or remaining in the territorial wa-
ters of such particular areas as might from time to time be designated by the means em-
ployed for the dissemination of hydrographical information relating to navigation. 124 The 
legislation of El Salvador of 193 3 impliedly permitted passage of warship~: 125 Honduras in 
193 5 decreed limitations on the entry of foreign warships into territorial waters, and re-
quired previous notification. However the intention seems to have been to regulate visiting 
118 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER B/6, 373 quoted by O'Connell p. 279 
119 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER B/6, 361 quoted by O'Connell p. 279 
120 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER B/6, 409 quoted by O'Connell p. 279 
121 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER B/6, 409 quoted by O'Connell p. 279 
122 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER B/6, 24 quoted by O'Connell p. 279 
123 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER B/6, 390 quoted O'Connell p. 279 
124 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER B/6, 384 quoted by O'Connell p. 280 
125 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER B/6, 126 quoted by O'Connell p. 280 
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rather than transiting vessels. 126 The Brazilian legislation of 1934 required preVIous 
authorisation. 127 These examples show the non-uniformity in state practice on the topic. 
2.4.2. Private attempts at codification in the 1920's 
There were some attempts in the 1920's by private organisations to codify the il).terna-
tional law of the sea. These attempts dealt with the problem of innocent passage of war-
ships too. The International Law Association. in article 10 of its 1926 Draft Convention on 
Maritime Jurisdiction in Time of Peace was clearly in favour of a right of innocent passage 
for warships. It stipulated: 
''The ships of all countries, public as well private have the right to pass freely 
through territorial waters, but are subject to the regulations enacted by the State 
through whose territorial waters they pass, provided that such regulations do not 
infringe any provisions contained in this Convention. "128 
The draft of the German Society of International Law_ merely, mentioned a right of pas-
sage without distinguishing the category of ships. 129 Strupp's draft referred only to mer-
chant ships. 130 In 1928 the Institute of International Law (Institut de Droit International) 
adopted the following rule: 
I 
"Le libre passage des navires de guerre peut etre assujetti a des regles speciales par l' Etat 
riverain." (Article 11)131 
126 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER. B/6, 143 quoted by O'Connell p. 280 
127 UN. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER. B/6, 363 quoted by O'Connell p. 280 
128 Report of the Thirty-Fourth Conference, 1926 p. 102 quoted by De Vries p. 38 
129 Mitteilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft fiir Volkerrecht Heft 8 (1927), 116 quoted by O'Connell p. 
281 
130 Strupp, K. Das Kiistenmeer im Volkerrecht der Gegenwart und Zukunft in 0. Schreiber (Ed.) Die 
Reichsgerichtspraxis im deutschen Rechtsleben (1929) [Festgabe zum 50-jahrigen Bestehen] p. 66 quoted 
by O'Connell p. 281 
131 34 Annuaire (1928) P. 758 quoted by de Vries p. 38 
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The draft of the American Institute of International Law was far from clear. It provides in 
art. 6: 
"The entry of warships shall depend entirely upon the consent of the republic, sovereign of 
the port. In time of peace such consent shall be presumed." 
Art. 9 provided: 
"Merchant vessels of all countries may pass freely through the territorial sea, 
subject to.the laws and regulations of the republic to which the said sea belongs. 
Neither warships nor merchant vessels can sojourn in the territorial sea or fish 
there, or commit any act involving the violation of those laws and regulations, 
without the authorisation of the said republic."132 
Another research drafl:133 on the topic from the American continent provides in the section 
territorial waters: ,/ 
"A state must permit innocent passage through its marginal sea by vessels of other states, 
but it may prescribe reasonable regulations for such passage." 
From this point of view it seems there could be a right of innocent passage, but in the 
comment on this article the opposite view adheres. 
"The word vessels in Article 14 is limited by the definition in Article 22, thus con-
fining innocent passage to vessels which are privately owned and privately oper-
ated and to vessels the legal status of which is assimilated to that of such vessels. 
This excludes vessels of war from exercising the right of innocent passage. The 
sovereignty of the littoral state is restricted by the right of innocent passage, be-
cause of a recognition of freedom of the seas for the commerce of all states. There 
is, therefore, no reason for freedom of innocent passage of vessels of war. Fur-
thermore, the passage of vessels of war near the shore of foreign states might give 
rise to misunderstanding even when they are in transit. Furthermore, the passage 
of vessels of war near the shores of foreign states and the presence without prior 
notice of vessels of war in marginal sea might give rise to misunderstanding even 
132 20 AJIL (1926) Special Supplement p. 323 art. 6, 9 . 
133 Research in International law -Harvard Law School- Nationality, Responsibility of States, Territorial 
Waters, art. 14; 23 AJIL (1929) Special Supplement part ill p. 295. 
l 
29 
when they are in transit. Such considerations seem to the be basis for the common 
practice of states in requesting permission for the entrance of their vessels of war 
into the ports of other states. A state may permit the· passage of the war vessels of 
other states through its marginal sea, but the text relieves it from any obligation to 
do so ... Regulations may, of course, distinguish different kinds ofvessels."134 
This draft of the Harvard Law School rejected the right of innocent passage for warships. 
It was the only draft made by a private institution, which denied expressly the right. 
2.4.3. The Hague· Codification Conference 1930 
2.4.3.1. Background 
The Hague Codification Conference in 1930 was the first rn,ajor attempt to codify some of 
the peace time rules of the international law of the sea. 
In 1924 the League of Nations appointed a Committee of Experts to draw up a list of 
subjects ripe for codification. Territorial waters, piracy, exploitation of marine resources 
and the legal status of State owned merchant ships were amongst the subjects considered. 
The Committee circulated "Questionnaires" to the governments on the first three of them. 
Subsequently, a Preparatory Commission was set up to prepare three topics - nationality, 
State responsibility and (very important) territorial waters - for codification. These prepa- . 
rations involved the circulation of a "Schedule of Points" to government~, and, after re-
plies had been received, the drafting of "Bases of Discussion" on which the Codification 
Conference could base its work. There were also reports on the topic drawn up by the 
German lawyer Schiicking. 135 
This was the basic work background for the Hague Conference. 
134 23 AJIL (1926) Supplement Part III Art.14 p. 295 
135 Churchill and Lowe p. 12 
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2. 4.3.2. The antecedents to innocent passage of warships 
2.4.3.2.1. Questionnaire of the Preparatory Committee 
On 2 September 1927 the Preparatory Committee was set up. 136 This committee raised the 
following points on innocent passage of warships : 
Point IX. Rights of passage: a) merchant ships; b) of warships; c) of submarines. Anchor-
ing in territorial ~aters while exercising the right of passage. Anchoring in case of distress 
Point X. Regulation of the passage and the anchoring in the territorial waters of foreign -~ . 
warships. Penalties for non observance of local laws and regulations. Right to require the 
ship to depart. 137 
This was the content of the questionnaire addressed to the governments by the Prepara-
tory Committee. 
Sch0cking, stated in his Report to the Committee of Experts that it was more natural to 
doubt -the pacific character of the passage of a large war fleet which enters the territorial 
sea in a time of general political tension than in the case of an ordinary merchant ship. 
However, he suggested that this did not affect in any way the legal principle that even . 
warships possess a right of common user in respect of foreign territorial waters, which 
could not be restricted arbitrarily, but only for reasons of national self-preservation. He 
argued that it was impbrtant that this principle be codified, in order that all vessels without 
distinction might be assured the right of passage. 138 Schucking proclaimed the right of pas-
sage for all vessels without distinction. 
136 22 AJII., (1926) Special Supplement p. 233, with the following members: Professor Basdevant 
(France), Counsellor Carlos Castro Ruiz (Chile), Professor Francois (Netherlands), Sir Cecil Hurst (Great 
Britain), M. Massimo Pilotti (Italy). 
137 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of the International Law, Bases of Discussion 
drawn up for the Conference by the Preparatory Committee, Vol. II - Territorial waters 
(C.74.M.39.1929.V), pp. 65 and 72 quoted by De Vries p. 40 
138 League of Nations Documents C.196.M.70.1927.V.l, p 44 quoted by O'Connell p.281 
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Twenty-three States commented on Point IX and twenty-two on Point X. 139 
/ 2.4.3.2.2. States which replied affirmatively 
On Point IX thirteen states contented that warships have a legal right of innocent passage 
through territorial waters, and mentioned it in the same breath as the right of innocent pas-
sage of merchant ships. These states were Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Great 
11 Britain, India, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Soviet Union, South Africa, and 
Sweden. Germany_recognised the right under Point X. Japan considered that such a right 
, should certainly be created. France replied with the formulation that warships may pass 
through French territorial waters without formality. Finland conceded the right of innocent 
passage of warships, but the coastal state has the authority to close certain areas to navi-
) gation. The point of view of the Netherlands was similar. It granted the right "in so far as 
/ 
the right is recognised by the rules of international law" and stated on Point X, "that pas-
sage through its territorial waters may be prohibited in special circumstances". 140 
2.4.3.2.3. States which required previous notification or authorisation 
The following states required previous notification authorisation. Belgium declared under 
Point X that it required previous notification of passage through its territorial sea. Roma- . 
nia demanded previous notification if a warship wished to pass through her territorial sea. 
For purposes of international codification, however, Romania recommended adoption of a 
rule requiring prior authorisation by the coastal state. Bulgaria and the United States also 
considered that warships may not pass through the territorial sea unless authorised by the 
coastal state. 
139 League of Nations Documents C.74.M.39.1929.V.1, p. 67 quoted by De Vries p. 41 
140 League of Nations Documents C.74.M.39.1929.V.1, p. 67 quoted by De Vries p. 41 
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2.4.3.2.4. Conclusion 
The replies of the governments ranged from the Bulgarian view of prior authorisation to 
the view of the Swedish government, that warships should comply with the same navig~-
tional requirements as merchant ships only, but it seemed that the majority of the govern-
ments tended to the Swedish view. 
2.4.3.3. Developments at the Conference 
The Preparatory Committee summarised all these observations as Basis of Discussion No. 
20 and No. 21. 
Basis of Discussion No. 20 
A coastal state should recognise the right of innocent passage through its territo-
rial waters of foreign warships, including submarines navigating on surface. 
A coastal State is entitled to make rules regulating the conditions of such passage 
without, however, having the right to require previous authorisation. A coastal 
state is entitled to make rules governing the anchoring of foreign warships in its 
territorial waters, but it may not forbid anchoring in case of damage to the ship or 
in distress. 141 
Basis of Discussion No. 21 
In foreign territorial waters, warships must respect the local laws and regulations. 
Any case of infringement will be brought to the attention of the captain : if he fails 
to comply with the notice so given, the ship may be required to depart. 142 
The Preparatory Committee, perceived no difficulty in the non uniformity of the replies of 
the governments and thought that the right of the coastal State to regulate could be ac-
cepted without difficulty. 143 
141 League ofNations Documents C.74.M.39.1929.V.2, 75 quoted by De Vries p. 41 
142 League of Nations Documents C.74.M.39.1929.V.2, 75 quoted by De Vries p. 42 
143 O'Connell p. 282 
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2.4.3 .3 .1. Discussions at the Conference 
However at the Hague Conference the situation was not so clear and easy. Not all delega-
tions .. discussed the passage of warships, only a few did. Here are some examples. The 
United States delegate denied the right. He said: 
"In my view, the right of innocent passage as a matter of a right does not extend to 
warships. It is ordinarily granted that the right of innocent passage is primarily in 
favour of commerce, and it seems to me that, so far as warships are concerned, the 
question is wholly one of usage and comity of nations. A coastal state is therefore 
quite wi~ its competence, at any rate as regards part of its coastal water . . . if it 
says that the right of innocent passage for warships does not exist there. A coastal 
state should ordinarily, as a matter of comity, permit innocent passage through its 
territorial waters of foreign warships, including submarines navigating on the sur-
face only and not submerged or half-awash. "144 
.1 The Romanian representative also considered that, it should be possible for the coastal 
state to require authorisation prior to the warships passag/145 Gidel the French delegate, 
proposed his own amendment 'to prevent ambiguity in regard to the right of passage 
through territorial waters of certain public vessels, which were not strictly speaking, mer-
chant ships. His solution was to refer to 'ships other than ships belonging to naval 
forces' .146 Great Britain proposed that the text should be redrafted to preserve the status 
quo, whatever that was. "The entry and the passage through territorial waters of a foreign 
warship shall continue to be regulated by the existing international usage and practice."147 
The purpose behind the British motion was that it was the best to 'let sl~~ping dogs lie', 
because the discussion did not show support for equivalent rights of war and merchant-
ships. 
144 League of Nations Documents C.352(b).M.145(b).1930.V.2, 59 quoted by De Vries p. 42 
145 League of Nations Documents C.352(b) M.145(b).1930.V.2, 59 quoted by De Vries p. 42 
146 League of Nations Documents C.35 l(b).M.145(b).1930.V.16, 59 quoted by O'Connell p. 282 




2.4.3.3.2. Results of the discussions 
The delegates seemed to prefer a solution that in times of a threat to national security, 
passage of warships could be prohibited and even in normal times previous authorisation 
or at least previous notification was required. 148 The Netherlands delegate wished to adopt 
the English version of Basis No. 20, with the insertion of" in normal times". Finally, the 
Spanish representative also required that the coastal state has the right to subject innocent 
passage to prior authorisation. 149 The Soviet Union did not participate at the Hague Con-
ference. The delegates did not pay a lot of attention to basis No. 21. 
The outcome was deliberately ambiguous. The article and observations, which were 
adopted then read as follows : 
Art. 12 
As a general rule, a coastal state will not forbid the.-passage of foreign war-
ships in its territorial sea and will not require a previous authorisation or 
notification. The coastal state has the right to regulate the conditions of 
such a passage. Submarines shall navigate on the surface. 
Observations 
To state that a coastal State will not forbid the innocent passage of foreign 
warships through its territorial sea is but to recognise existing practice. 
That practice also, without laying down any strict and absolute rule, leaves 
to the state the power in exceptional cases to prohibit the passage of for-
eign warships in its territorial sea. The coastal state may regulate'-the con-
ditions of passage particularly as regards the number of foreign units pass-
ing simultaneously, through its territorial sea - or through any particular 
portion of that sea - though as a general rule no previous authorisation or 
even notification will be required. Under no pretext, however, may there be 
any interference with the passage of warships through straits constituting a 
route for international marine traffic between two parts of the high sea. 150 
148 O'Connell p. 283 
149 De Vries p. 43 




If a foreign warship passing through the territorial sea does not comply 
with the regulations of the coastal State and disregards any request for 
compliance which may be brought to its notice, the coastal State may re-
quire the warship to leave the territorial sea. 
Observations 
A special stipulation to the effect that warships must in the territorial sea, 
respect the local laws and regulations has been thought unnecessary. Nev-
ertheless;·-it seemed advisable to indicate that on non observance of the 
regulations the right of free passage ceases and that consequently the war-
ship may be required to leave the territorial sea. 151 
2.4.4. Conclusion 
The proposed article at the Hague Conference was plainly a compromise formula. Admit-
tedly. it did not express the passage of warships as an absolute right in all circumstances, 
but at the same time it did require the coastal state not to forbid passage save in excep-
tional cases. 152 
The use of "will" instead of "shall" in art. 12 signifies that the requirement is not a legally 
obligatory one for the coastal state. 153 
I 
The Hague Conference did not enjoy success in on the topic territorial waters. No Con-
vention was adopted. Hence the problem was still unresolved. The reasons for the contro-
versy are clear. The ~ajor naval powers were seeking maximum freedom to manoeuvre 
their warships to secure their interests all over the world. Great Britain and France , the 
main supporters of a right of innocent passage for warships, had at this time colonial em-
pires all over the world. To ensure access for their warships to these somewhat remote . 
151 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of the International Law, Report of the Second 
Committee (Territorial Sea) (C.230.M.117.1930.V) p.10 quoted by De Vries p. 44 
152 O'Connell p. 285 





areas, it was sometimes convenient to cross the territorial waters of other states. Hence it 
was necessary for them to have such a right. Other states with small fleets, short coasts or 
no particular interests overseas denied such a right. For them it was a threat to their se-
curity. This strong division of interests prevented the adoption of any clear rule on the 
matter. However the Hague Conference did not fail because of this issue. The main reason 
for the failure of the Conference in 193 0 to adopt a convention on territorial waters was, 
that the delegations were unable to find a compromise on the issue of the breath of the 
territorial sea. 
During the next fifteen years until the end of World War II nothing fundamental changed 
··~. ~-
in the light of our topic. The only thing worth mentioning is an incident in connection with 
the war and the law of neutrality. 
2.4.5. World War II - The Altmark Incident 
The "Altmark" was a former German merchantman steamer that had become a German 
naval auxiliary. 154 She was armed and flew the German official service flag as a public ves-
sel. In February 1940 she was carrying as prisoners British merchant seamen that had been 
captured by the "Admiral Graf Spee". At the time of the incident, she was · attempting to 
bring the prisoners back from the South Atlantic to Germany. For this purpose she 
avoided the English Channel and the Allied blockade by using Swedish ,?Itd Norwegian 
territorial waters. After she entered Norwegian territorial waters, she was stopped, her 
papers were inspected. and inquiry was made as to the presence of prisoners on board. 
False answers were given and were accepted by the Norwegian authorities. In the mean-
time the "Altmark" was discovered by British forces who demanded an inspection by the 
Norwegians, but the Norwegians refused. Shortly after this the "Altmark" was boarded by 
the British and the prisoners released. The Norwegian government protested against this 
because of the violation of their sovereignty. 155 
154 MacChesney, p. 322 
155 MacChesney, p. 323 
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Shortly afterwards and again after the war a dispute developed in about this. The issue 
was, whether the "Altmark's" circuitous route and her extended trip through the Norwe-
gian territorial waters was an abuse of neutrality regulations under art. X of the Hague 
Convention XIIl Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. 156 
In terms of the Convention, the act of the British Navy was a violation of the neutrality of 
Norway, but the Hague Convention was not technically in force in World War II, because 
certain belligerents including the United Kingdom, were not parties to it. It was recognised 
however that the provisions of the Convention as a whole constituted binding international 
customary law. 157 Hence British writers argued that the deliberately use of neutral territo-
·•. 
rial waters was an abuse of the passage right.· 
This case does not however contribute much to do with our topic. It shows, however as 
mentioned before, that there was something of a "passage right" for belligerents to use 
neutral territorial waters in international customary law. Why therefore should there not be 
a right in time of peace? 
2.5. Development from 1945 to UNCLOS 11958 
2.5.1. State practice 
The state practice after World War II was not so different from state practice before the 
war. Sixteen countries expressly granted the right of innocent passage to warships subject 
to possible restrictive conditions such as time limits on their stay in the territorial sea, a 
limit on warships of one and the same nationality allowed to stay simultaneously in the 
territorial sea, the requirement of previous notification and other conditions. 158 They were 
156 Art. X provides that the neutrality of a power is not affected by the mere passage through its territorial 
waters of warships or prizes belonging to belligerents. 
Art. II provides that 'any act of hostility, including capture and the exercise of the right of search, commit-
ted by belligerent warships in the territorial waters of a neutral Power constitutes a violation of neutrality. 
157 MacChesney p. 324 
158 Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea UN. Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SERB/6 




Cambodia, Denmark, Brazil, Lebanon, Libya, Peru, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Honduras, Iran, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia. Only 
two countries expressly denied warships the right of innocent passage, since they sub-
jected it to prior authorisation. They were Bulgaria and Romania. 159 The United States 
required prior authorisation for the entrance of foreign warships in their ports 160, but it is 
doubtful if this rule was applicable to the territorial sea. In the light of the opposing atti-
tudes displayed during negotiations at UNCLOS I. 
Thirteen states had law and regulations in force relating to the presence and the navigation 
of foreign warships in territorial waters, but did not mention expressly passage rights. 161 
..... , 
These were Chile, Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland and South Africa. 
The silence may be interpreted as an implied recognition of the right. 162 The law of twenty 
other coastal states was also silent and it might be concluded they were not opposed to the 
innocent passage of warships. 163 They were Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, 
Greece, Iceland, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Monaco, Morocco, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, United Kingdom and the United States. 
To.summarise it may be concluded that a considerable number of states expressly or im-
plied recognised the right. 164 Only a small number of coastal states denied the right. Com-
pared to the time before the Hague Conference, the situation was the same. 
159 Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea UN. Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/6 
(1957) quoted by De Vries p. 48 
160 Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea UN. Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/6 
(1957) quoted by De Vries p. 48 
161 Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea UN. Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/6 
(1957) quoted by De Vries p. 49 
162 Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea UN. Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/6 
(1957) quoted by De Vries p. 49 
163 Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea UN. Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/6 
(1957) quoted by De Vries p. 49 
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2.5.2. The Corfu Channel Case 1949 
The Corfu Channel Case is actually out of place here, because it does not deal with the 
right of innocent passage of warships in territorial waters. It deals with the right of inno-
cent passage of warships in straits only. Nevertheless it is a important milestone in the 
history of the dispute. The pleadings of both parties, the United Kingdom and Albania are 
based on support of the right of irµiocent passage of warships in territorial waters or on 
the rejection of the existence of the right. Briefly the history of the Corfu Channel incident 
is as follows. In late 1944 the Corfu Channel. was swept by allied minesweepers. After the 
war, in autumn 1946, British naval vessels sought entry to the Channel, which is formed 
by the Albanian mainland and the Greek island Corfu. Shortly after the entry some British 
vessels were damaged and some seamen were injured and killed. It was not possible to 
find out who was responsible for the laying of the mines. 
Albania claimed the passage of the British warships through-the Corfu Channel violated its 
sovereignty. The British Government claimed the right of innocent passage for warships 
also for warships. Both parties expected a resolution of the dispute from the judgement of 
the International Court of Justice. However the International Court of Justice avoided ex-
pressing an opinion on the right of innocent passage of warships through territorial waters. 
It limited its observations to the case of straits, and did not advert to the British contention 
that the right of passage of warships through straits was merely a particular instance of a 
general right of passage through the territorial sea. 165 It held: "In these circ.umstances, it is 
unnecessary to consider the more general question, much debated by the parties, whether 
states under internati~nal law have the right to send warships in time of peace through 
territorial waters not included in a strait."166 There were also two dissenting opinions by 
judges Azvedo and Krylov who held that the right of innocent passage of warships does 
not exist. 167 
165 O'Connell p. 286 
166 ICJ Report 1949 p. 30 quoted by de Vries p. 45 
167 O'Connell p. 286 
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2.5.3. Developments in the International Law Commission 
2. 5.3. 1. General 
After the League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations in 1945, the member-
states of this new organisation set up a commission to codify international law. This was 
the International Law Commission (ILC) with thirty-four members. The first were elected 
hi in 1948. The ILC started by preparing draft articles on the High Seas and the Territorial 
Waters. Its rappo1:1eur was Francois, the same who had prepared the Hague Conference 
Report. In 1956 the ILC had produced a report, which covered all the aspects of the law 
of the sea in this time. The report was the basis for the work of the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1958. 
During its work the ILC also dealt with the problem of whether warships have a right of 
innocent passage through the territorial sea or not. 
2.5.3.2. Developments at the sixth session of the /LC 
Francois submitted his report to the ILC at the fourth session in 1951. It contained articles 
12 and 13 of the Hague Conference. A paragraph four was added to the first article (the 
old article 12 of the Hague Conference). This reflected the decision in the "Corfu Chan-
nel" Case. The second article was identical to art. 13 of the Hague Conference. The arti-
. cles read as follows: . 
First article 
1. As a general rule, a coastal state will not forbid the passage of foreign warships 
in its territorial sea and will not require a previous authorisation or notification. 
2. Toe coastal State has the right to regulate the conditions of such a passage. 
3. Submarines shall navigate on surface. 
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4. Under no pretext, however, may there be any interference with the passage of 
warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the 
high seas. 168 
Second article 
If a foreign warship passing through the territorial sea does not comply with the 
regulations of the coastal State and disregards any request for compliance which 
may be brought to its notice, the coastal State may require the warship to leave the 
territorial sea. 169 
After the ILC had adopted these two articles with some modifications, the UN member 
states were requested to comment upon them. Eighteen governments replied: ten States 
commented on the first article and six on the second article. 170 Seven States agreed with 
the principles of the first article (Belgium, Brazil, Egypt, Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Thailand and the United States). Yugoslavia wanted the possibility of requiring 
previous notification. The attitude of Haiti was that passage of warships was subject to the 
/ 
express consent of the coastal state. The six States which commented the second article 
agreed with the principle laid down in it. 171 After the commentaries the first article read as 
follows: 
1. Subject to observance of the provisions of articles 17-21, warships shall have 
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. As a general rule previous /,,,. 
authorisation or notification shall be required. Such authorisation or notification ,,/ 
may however be prescribed for certain parts of the territorial sea , or in times of 
crisis, in order to protect the military interests of a State, provided that there be no 
interference with passage through straits used for international navigation between 
two parts of the high seas. 
2. Submarines shall navigate on the surface. 
This formulation was just in the interest of .the USA and its allies. That was very surpris-
ing, because the USA was such an opponent of the right before World War II at the 
Hague Conference 1930 and before the North Atlantic Fishery Arbitration in 1910. 
168 ILC. Yearbook 1953 Vol. II p. 58 quoted by De Vries p. 50 
169 ILC. Yearbook 1953 Vol. II p. 58 quoted by De Vries p. 50 
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2.5.3.3. Developments at the seventh session of the ILC 
At the seventh session of the ILC in 1955 there was a very fundamental discussion of the 
first article. The opposition to a right of innocent passage of warships in territorial waters 
was growing. There were two chief views. The affirmative group for a right was leaded by 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. He said: 
"If previous authorisation or notification were to be required in all instances a se-
vere restriction would be placed on the nonnal movements of warships in peace-
time. Commerce was not the only legitimate object of navigation and vessels 
passing through a territorial sea for another reason should not be ipso facto re-
garded as suspect. "172 
I-J:e suggested contributing to the protection the interests of the coastal state by including 
in the first article a reference to draft arts. 17 and 20 para 2 which gave the coastal State 
the right to suspend innocent passage temporarily and locally. Hence there should be suf-
ficient protection of the interests of the coastal State. 
The opposite group was headed by Zourek. He considered that the passage of warships is 
subject to the consent of the coastal state and referred to the draft conventions of the Insti-
tut de Droit International and the Harvard Law School. Warships constituted for him a 
threat, because of their nature. He therefore could not agree with the text which granted 
warships the right. Zourek was supported by Krylov. 173 
To achieve a solution the ILC chairman Spiroupoulos requested the Commission either to 
I 
opt for Fitzmaurice's or Zourek's opinion. After this request both groups struggled, to 
find an adequate procedure to opt. Finally Zourek formulated the basic question for the 
ILC to decide as follows: 
"Does the coastal State enjoy, in virtue of its sovereignty over the territorial sea, 
the general right to forbid the passage of foreign warships through its territorial 
sea - in other words, the right to make such passage subject to previous authorisa-
tion or notification. ?"174 
172 ILC Yearbook 1955 Vol. Ip. 143 quoted by De Vries p. 52 
173 De Vries p. 52 
174 ILC Yearbook 1955 Vol. Ip. 148 quoted by De Vries p. 53 
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The result of the vote was six affirmative to three with four abstentions. Subsequently the 
Drafting Committee was requested to re-formulate the First Article. In the light of the 
vote it read as follows: 
1. The coastal state may make the passage of warships through the territorial sea 
subject to previous authorisation or notification. Normally it shall grant innocent 
passage subject to the observance of the provisions of Articles 19 and 20. 
2. It may not interfere in any way with innocent passage through straits normally 
used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas. 
ti 3. Submarines shall navigate on the surface. 
i 
The re-formulati;ii was accepted by eight votes to two, with one abstention. All draft ar-
ticles were submitted to the governments of the UN-member states again. Eight com-
mented on the first article. 175 
2.5.3.4. Developments at the eight session of the ILC 
At the eight session the battle went on. Fitzmaurice, strongly supported by Scelle and El 
Khouri, still fiercely opposed the text of the first article, while Zourek defended it. 176 
However nothing big was changed, only some small changes being. The main content, that 
innocent passage was subject to previous notification was unchanged. The first article be-
came article 24 of the final draft of the ILC for the Convention Conference. It read as fol-
lows: 
The coastal State may make the passage of warships through the territorial sea 
subject to previous authorisation and notification. Normally it shall grant innocent 
passage subject to the observance of the provisions of Article 17 (i.e. the rights of 
protection of the coastal State) and 18 (i.e. duty of foreign ships in innocent pas-
sage to comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State). 
This formula seems to be a compromise between the two opinions (' .. normally it shall 
grant'). The commentary on article 24 stated: 
175 ILC Yearbook 1956 Vol. II p. 31 quoted by De Vries p. 54 
176 ILC Yearbook 1956 Vol. I pp. 211-216 quoted by De Vries p. 54 
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" ... While it js true that a large number of States do not require previous authori-
sation or notification, the Commission can only welcome this attitude, which dis-
plays a laudable respect for the principles of freedom of communications, but this 
does not mean that a State would not be entitled to require such notification or 
authorisation if it deemed to be necessary to take this precautionary measure. 
Since it admits that the passage of warships through the territorial sea of another 
state can be considered by that State as a threat to its security, and is aware that a 
number of States do require previous notification or authorisation the Commission 
is not in a position to dispute the right of States to take such a measure. "177 
It seemed that the battle was lost by the advocates of an unlimited the right of innocent 
passage for warships. At the ILC meetings there was no a open dispute between the real 
contestants (the Communist bloc against NATO powers). The ILC was only a forum of 
jurists to prepare the law of the sea for codification at the Conference. However the dis-
.•. 
cussion at the ILC meetings showed that this was not a dispute between jurists only. It 
was already a fight between the two blocks, in a kind of "proxy war''. The real dispute 
/ 
should follow, when the official delegations should meet at the Conference in Geneva 
1958. 
2.5.4. The Geneva Conference 
2. 5.4. 1. General 
At the Geneva Confer~nce - officially called the United Nation Conference on the Law of 
the Sea [UNCLOS 1178] - eighty-six States took part, almost the double number at the 
Hague Conference 1930. UNCLOS I was successful in the adoption of four Conventions, 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (TSC), the Convention on 
the High Seas (HSC), the Convention on the Continental Shelf (CSC) and the Convention 
177 ILC Yearbook 1956 Vol. II pp.276-277 quoted by De Vries p. 55 
178 UNCLOS I, because it was followed by UNCLOS II and UNCLOS ill 
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on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. Our topic was 
dealt within TSC. 
2.5.4.2. Developments at the Conference 
The draft which was presented to the Geneva Conference, subjected innocent passage of 
warships to previous authorisation or notification. This was contrary to the attitude of 
ti NATO States and in the interests of the Soviet Bloc. 
) 
On the 10 April ·1958 the Soviet Bloc secured a victory and the first article was adopted 
(with amendments) by the First Committee by 54 votes to 5 with 8 abstentions. It read as 
follows: 
1. The coastal State may make the passage of warships through the territorial sea 
subject to previous authorisation or notification. Normally it shall grant innocent 
passage subject to the observance of the provisions of Articles 17 and 18. 
2. During the passage, warships have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of 
any state other than its flag state.179 
This development was unacceptable for the Western States. In the Plenary meeting, the 
next level of the adoption process, on the 27 April 1958 parliamentary tactics were em-
ployed and resistance organised. The Danish delegation proposed changing the text to the 
following: 
1. The coastal State may make the passage through territorial sea subject to previ-
ous notification. Such a passage shall be subject to the provisions of articles 15 to 
18. 
2. During passage warships have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any 
State other than the flag State. 
The Italian representative proposed a separate vote on the words "authorisation or". 180 
This proposal was adopted by 50 votes to 24 with 5 abstentions. The tactics of the West-
179 United Nations Conference on he Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. ill: First Committee 
(Territorial Sea and Contiguos Zone) p. 260 quoted by De Vries p. 56 
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em counties showed that they tried to create something like a right, because if this version 
was to be adopted, there would still be a right, which could be exercised subject to previ-
ous notification. Of course the coastal state could forbid the passage, but that would be 
only ·under exceptional circumstances, as in the case of merchant ships. In the case of pre-
vious authorisation, there would not be a right because passage would depend completely 
on the consent of the coastal State. From this point of view, this tactic was able to pre-
serve some kind of a right for the NATO States. 
The Plenary Meeting voted first on the Italian proposal. The words "authorisation or'' in 
the first article (art. 24 of the draft) were rejected by 27 votes to 45 with 6 abstentions . 
..... 
This made the Danish proposal superfluous. 181 After this the first article dealt with previ-
ous notification only. This partial victory of the NATO-Bloc was unacceptable for the 
communist countries. The only way to stop this amendment from becoming a Convention 
article, was to prevent the required two-thirds majority in the final vote. (this majority was 
required to adopt an article as part of the Convention). 
The amended article got 43 votes in favour, 24 against and 12 abstentions. Thus it failed 
to get the required two thirds majority and was not adopted. 182 
The second article was adopted without change in the plenary meeting. It read as follows: 
If any warship does not comply with the regulations of the coastal State concern-
ing passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance 
180 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. Up. 66 quoted by De Vries p . 
. . 56. 
181 United Nations Confer~nce on the Law of the Sea, Oficcial Records. Vol. II p. 67 quoted by De Vries p. 
57 
182 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records. Vol. II p. 68 quoted by De Vries p. 
57. The states in favour were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, EL Salvador, France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Great Britain, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
South Africa, South-Vietnam, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Venezuela, and the United States. The States 
against were: Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Federation of Malaya, Poland, Romania, Saudi-Arabia, Republic of Korea, 
Soviet Union, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine , United Arabic Republic and Yugoslavia. The following states 
were abstained : Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Finland, Greece, Holy See, Laos, Liberia, Mexico, Ne-
pal, Switzerland, and Uruguay. 
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which is made to it, the coastal State may require the warship to leave the territo-
rial sea. 183 
2.5.4.3. Conclusion 
The reasons for the difference between the two groups were political and military rather 
than ideological in nature. The affirmative group were mostly western orientated states 
and their allies. In the negative group were the communist orientated states and newly in-
dependent states. This group could be called the "second and third" world. 
In the first group;- were states such as the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands 
which traditionally had big naval fleets. Surprisingly, we can find in this group also the 
United States. Before the war the United States was the main opponent of such a right. 
This shows clearly from the statement of Elihu Root in the North Atlantic Fishery Arbi-
tration in 1910 and the attitude at the Hague Conference, where the US-delegate rejected 
the right of innocent passage of warships. After the war the USA changed their position. 
They now had a big naval fleet as the result of the war and big see battles against Japan in 
1941-1945. The USA now needed a passage right for warships, as did the United King-
dom, which had maintained a big war fleet for ages. Of course at the conference the oppo-
* nents of the right did n?t fail to remember the USA as a former opponent of the right, 
which was certainly embarrassing for the USA. . 
In the first group most states were like Bulgaria, Poland and Yugoslavia. They had as this 
time traditionally small coastal navies and fishing fleets. They did not see the necessity of a 
passage right of warships through the territorial sea, because they did not have so many of 
them. For them such a passage right was a threat. The attitude of the Soviet Union was 
surprising too. Before the war it affirmed the right, as the former legislation and the reply 
to the questionnaires for the Hague Conference show. The USSR was now a 
"superpower" without a big naval fleet. I:Ience they rejected such a right. After the Con-
ference all Soviet Bloc countries except Poland made reservations asserting the right of 
183 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records. Vol. II p. 68 quoted by De Vries p. 
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the littoral state to detennine184 whether and how warships may pass through the territo-
rial sea. Colombia made an unusual declaration that since its Constitution requires the 
consent of its Senate to the passage of foreign troops through Colombian territory, by 
analogy such authorisation would also be required for the passage of foreign warships 
through its territorial sea. The Soviet Union for example made the following reservation to 
art. 23 TSC: 
"The Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics considers that a coastal 
State has the right to establish procedures for authorisation of passage of foreign warships 
"'~ ~~ 
through its territorial waters."185 
This development showed that the Communist countries could not accept the result of the 
non-regulation in regard to our topic. They still rejected anything what could lead to the 
conclusion there might be such a right. 
2.5.5. Interpretations of developments at the Conference 
The entire Geneva Conference 1958 was a success because for the first time the Law of 
the Sea became codified. With regard to our topic UNCLOS I was unsatisfactory. I shall 
deal with this very briefly only, because the emphasis in this thesis is rn~re a historical · 
overview than a detailed presentation of the dispute. Here are the arguments of the sup-
porters of a right of innocent passage. This group argued that TSC contains such a right, 
because section III, subsection A has the title "Rules applicable to all ships". They say that 
all ships includes merchant ships and warships too. They also used the division of subsec-
tion B (Rules applicable to merchant ships) and subsection D (Rules applicable to war-
ships) to support this view, because subsection A, which is before, laid down the right of 
184 Jessup, The United Nation Conference on the Law of the Sea p. 248 
185 Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the Secretary General performs Depositary Functions, 1971, 
ST/LEG/SERD/4, Ch.XX!, pp. 363 quoted by De Vries p. 64 
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innocent passage for warships. Fitzmaurice put this view as following : "Consequently, the 
Convention created no special regime of warships, and does not place upon them any dis-
abilities, as compared with merchant ships, or subject them to any conditions or restric-
tions to which the latter are not subject, but gives them exactly the same rights." 186 This 
group also argues that art. 23 gives the coastal State authority only to regulate the use of 
the territorial sea by foreign warships but not to require previous permission for their 
transit. 187 Another argument of the group in favour of a right is that the Geneva Confer-
ence article which provided for previous notification got a majority of the votes, and failed 
only on the req~~ed 2/3 majority. Other members of the group cited the decision of the 
ICJ in the Corfu Channel case as an argument in favour of a right, but this view is not 
correct because the judgement only deals with passage of warships in straits. 
The following are the arguments of the opponents of such a right. This group says, that 
there is nothing mentioned in the Convention, which would lead to the conclusion that 
there is a right of innocent passage for warships. Only art., 23 deals with warships, but it 
does not confirm such a right. Subsection D is not related to subsection A from this view 
point. They also point out, that the article which prescribed a right, did not get the re-
quired 2/3 majority and failed. A subgroup of the group points out in relation to art. 23 
that "... the clause requiring foreign warships to observe the rules governing passage 
through territorial waters laid down by the coastal State remained. Such rules can of 
course, include a requirement that prior permission has to be obtained or prior notification 
of the passage has to be given." 188 It seems to be doubtful whether art. 23 contain a re- . 
I 
quirement of prior authorisation, because a majority of the states voted in the plenary 
meeting against previous authorisation and deleted it from the proposal. 189 The normal 
practice, where a convention does not give the answer to a problem is to look to interna-
tional customary law. However this does not give any further clarification, because there is 
no uniform state practice on innocent passage of warships. The problem was still unre-
solved at the beginning of the 1960' s. 
186 Fitzmaurice in: Some results ... p. 102 
187 O'Connell p. 290 
188 C. M. Franklin quoted by De Vries p. 62 




2.6. Developments to date 
2.6.1. State practice in the 1960's and 1970's 
As with state practice in the 1920's and 1950's nothing fundamental changed on the 
treatment of the right of innocent passage. Some states still required previous authorisa-
tion and notification, some states did not require anything for innocent passage of foreign 
warships through the territorial sea. 
-» 
After UNCLOS I states tried to avoid confrontation on this issue in practice. Where a 
coastal state did not require authorisation or notification, it seemed that the naval powers 
gave none. Where some requirement was laid down by national legislation, low level con-
tacts between naval attaches and local navy officers on a rather informal basic seemed to 
be favoured. 190 
There is one example from the state practice of the superpowers in the 1960' s. In August 
1967 two US coastguard icebreakers wanted to navigate through the Vilitsky Strait. The 
Vilitsky Straits are formed by the southern island of Sevemaja Zemlya and the Geyberga 
Island and by these islands and the Taymyr peninsula. They have a width of 22 miles and 
of 11 miles. Hence they are Soviet territorial waters, since claimed 12 nm territorial wa-
ters. Both icebreakers had military equipment on board and also fulfilled the other re-
quirement in the definition of a warship under art. 8 (2) HSC. The Soviet Union made a 
reservation at UNCLOS I that it would require for the passage of foreign warships in its 
territorial waters previous authorisation. In 1960 the it adopted Rules for the Visit of For-
eign Warships in Territorial Waters and Ports of the USSR. This rules provided that per-
mission should be sought from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not later than 30 days prior 
to the passage. Neither icebreaker complied with this requirement. The judgement of the 
ICJ in the Corfu Channel case did not help' either because the Vilitsky Straits were more a 
route used for national navigation. Most of the year they are covered by ice. Only the So-
viet Union used them as part of the Northeast passage for navigation at this time with the 
190 Churchill and Lowe p. 75 
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assistance of its icebreakers. Hence the Vilitsky Straits were not straits used for interna-
tional navigation. The judgement in the Corfu Channel case did not give the USA a right 
of passage here. Both warships had to return. 191 This example shows how the main adver-
saries dealt with each other at the time of the cold war. 
2.6.2. UNCLOS ill 
2. 6.2. 1. General 
1:he next big step in the development of our issue is the 'Third United Nation Conference 
on the Law of the Sea' (UNCLOS ill). The Second United Nation.Conference on the Law 
of the Sea did not deal with our topic. The main issue w~~ the unresolved breath of the. 
territorial sea. UNCLOS II failed by only one vote to adopt a six mile territorial sea plus 
six mile fishery zone. 
UNCLOS ill was completely different compared to the both other Conferences on the 
· Law of the Sea. A main feature was the big attendance of states. About 150 took part at 
the negotiations. Among them were many of newly independent states, which previously 
could not take part in international conferences. A feature at UNCLOS ill was that it had 
no 'Bases of discussion' or ILC report as an aid for its work, as did the Hague Conference _ 
and UNCLOS I. Every issue had to be discussed in detail between the participants. With 
150 participants that was sometimes complicated, because each state had its own interests 
and defended them. Soon three big interests groups emerged. They were the 'Group of 
77' being mostly developing states, the group of the Western, capitalist countries and the 
group of European socialist countries. Main issues at the Conference were for example 
deep sea bed exploitation and recognition of EEZ. All these topics and the procedure for 
adoption by consensus made negotiations difficult. That was also a reason why UNCLOS 
ill was the longest conference in the history of the United Nations. The Conference held 
191 Pharandt p. 131 
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its first session in 1973 and worked for several month each year until the final adoption of 
the Convention in 1982. 
2. 6.2.2. Developments on our topic 
ti 2.6.2.2.1. Developments in the 1970's 
The right of inn~~ent passage. was discussed in the main Committee Two of the Confer-
ence, which dealt also with innocent passage in the territorial sea .. 
T,here was a fortuitous coincidence of interests of the superpowers USSR and USA on 
innocent passage at UNCLOS. The immediate result of this convergence of interest was 
the principle of equality between merchantships and wars~ps in the Informal Single Ne-
gotiating Text of 1975. In the revised text of 1976 no mention was made however about 
this equality and the old situation, as at the Geneva Conference prevailed. 192 
2.6.2.2.2. Attempts to establish of a notification/authorisation regime 
The issue came up again during the Eleventh (NewYork) session of the Conference 
(March-April 1982), when two amendments were proposed on this question The first was · 
'. 
proposed by Gabon. It contained a new subparagraph (b) after art. 21 (1) (a), as follows: 
(b) navigation of warships including the right to require prior authorisation and notifica-
tion for passage through the territorial sea 193 
The second amendment was proposed and supported by 29 states and sought to add the 
word security after the word immigration in article 21 (1) (h). Under such an amendment 
192 Informal Single Negotiating Text 1975 Art 29 (2) quoted by O'Connell p. 292 
193 A/CONF.62/L/97, UNCLOS III Off.Rec, Vol XVI, 1984, p.217 quoted by Brown p. 67 
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the coastal State would have a right to adopt laws relating to innocent passage for all ves-
sels to prevent infringement of its security laws and regulations. 194 The following repre-
sents some of the views of delegations. On the introduction of the amendment, the dele-
gate of Gabon said that " ... the innocent passage of warships had a bearing on the military 
security of states, a problem which was not dealt with clearly enough by the 29 states 
amendment". Hence his delegation introduced a own amendment, because "it is necessary 
to adopt coercive measures and sanctions against foreign warships which contravened the 
security, laws and regulations of the coastal state."195 The Romanian delegation described 
the right of prior authorisation and notification as " ... being based on the principles of the 
~~ •' 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state."196 Also the Filipino delegation indicated 
that "it would rather prefer in regard to the 29 state amendment an explicit recognition of 
the competence of the coastal State to require prior authorisation or notification of the 
passage ofwarships."197 Within the group there were also very divergent views. There was 
for example the Brazilian attitude. Brazil supported both amendments; but "did not con-
sider it essential to have a provision on that point in the convention, since it believed that 
states were entitled under international law to adopt legislation regulating the passage of 
warships, through their territorial sea, and the convention would not deprive them of that 
right." 198 The Iranian attitude was similar. The Iranian delegate pointed out that "Iran had 
always insisted on prior authorisation for the passage of warships through its territorial 
sea."199 
2.6.2.2.3. Withdrawal of attempts and the aftermath 
However at the end of the day, the supporters of the amendments withdrew their propos-
als. In announcing the withdrawal the President of the Conference Ambassador Koh read 
out the following statement: 
194 Brown p. 67 
195 UNCLOS III Off. Rec., Vol. XVI pp. 107, para 18, quoted by Brown p. 67 
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"Although the sponsors of the amendment in document A/CONF.62/L.117 had 
proposed with a view to clarifying the text of the draft convention, in response to 
the Presidents appeal they have agreed not to press it into vote. They would, how-
ever, like to reaffirm that their decision is without prejudice to the rights of the 
coastal States to adopt measures to safeguard security interests, in accordance 
with the articles 19 and 25 of the draft convention. "200 
The reasons for this withdrawal are not clear. Probably the diplomatic pressure from the 
marine powers was too strong. They wanted to avoid every vote on this issue to preserve 
the old status quo from the Geneva Conference. It was a defeat for the developing coun-
tries. Neverthele;s, the group did not give up. First they made statements. The Albanian 
delegate stated shortly after the formal adoption that, 
"The text of the Convention violated the sovereign rights of the coastal States. It 
was essential to bear in mind the danger which the so-called innocent passage pre-
sented in current geographical conditions (in the 1980's) in which two super-
Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had deployed war fleets and in-
stalled military, naval airbases in all seas and oceans. The passage of such,fleets 
was always objectionable, threatening and aggressive. The two super-Powers and 
military blocs had used every possible method to impose their position on the Con-
ference in order to have a free hand to justify the aggressive movements of war-
ships. "201 
Cuba's statement asserted a "right to enact laws and regulations to safeguard its security 
interests. "202 Romania stated that, " ... the territorial sea is an integral part of the national 
territory and is under the full jurisdiction of the coastal state. That is wh1 nothing could · 
prevent the coastal State from adopting national regulation.s to protect its security inter-
ests. "203 This interpre!ation is an overemphasis of sovereignty in the territorial sea. The 
right of innocent passage, as an exception to the sovereignty principle in the territorial 
waters, is well established in international customary law for the last 100 years. 
Another possibility for parties to an international treaty to declare this opposition, is by 
making a reservation. The legal effect of such a reservation is that the content of the res-
200 UNCLOS ill Off. Rec., Vol. XVI p. 131 para 3 quoted by Brown p. 67 
201 UNCLOS ill Off. Rec., Vol. XVI p. 155, para 35 quoted by Brown p. 68 
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ervation is not applicable to the reserving state. The situation under LOSC is quite differ-
ent, because under art 309 reservations are not allowed. There are only some exceptions 
allowed, for example in regard to the settlement of disputes. Hence, a reservation in re-
gard to innocent passage is not possible. Nevertheless there are also other possibilities to 
express disagreement. This can be done by a declaration204. A number of states made dec-
larations when they signed, ratified or acceded to the Convention. The most extreme as-
sertion of the alleged right of a coastal state to req1;1ire previous authorisation was made by 
the Yemen Arab Republic, when it signed the Convention. 
"The Yemen Arab Republic adheres to the concept of general international law 
concerning free passage as applying exclusively to merchant ships and aircraft, 
nuclear-powered craft, as well as warships and warplanes in general, must obtain 
the prior agreement of the Yemen Arab Republic before passing through its terri-
torial waters, in accordance with the established norm of general international law 
relating to national sovereignty. "205 
In another paragraph of this declaration Yemen stated that its signature is subject to the 
provisions of this declaration. 206 This formulation comes close to an illegal reservation ac-
cording to art. 309 LOSC. Sao Tome and Principe went further and declared at the time 
of its signature to the convention : 
'The Government of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe reserves 
the right to adopt laws and regulations relating to innocent passage of foreign war-
ships through its territorial or its archipelagic waters and to take any other meas-
ures aimed at safeguarding its security. "207 
This declaration was not however repeated, when Sao Tome and Principe ratified the 
Convention in 1987.208 Egypt also declared when it ratified the Convention, that the pas-
204 The legal effect of a declaration is that it can be used for interpreting state practice to the convention. 
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sage of warships is subject to previous notification.209 Yugoslavia did the same way and 
declared at the time of ratification, that: 
" .. a coastal State may, by its laws and regulations, subject the passage of foreign 
warships to the requirement of previous notification to the respective coastal State 
and limit the number of ships simultaneously passing, on the basis of the interna-
tional customary law and in compliance with the right of innocent passage (articles · 
17-32 ofthe Convention)."210 
The declaration of Iran, made at the time of signing the Convention was similar to the 
declaration made by Yemen. It asserted that Iran is entitled to adopt laws and regulations 
regarding, inter alia the requirement of prior authorisation for warships wishing to exercise 
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 211 _Romania as traditional oppo-
nent of the right of innocent passage declared that " .. the coastal State is entitled to adopt 
measures to safeguard their security interests, including the right to adopt national laws 
and regulations relating to the passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea."212 
Romania was the only Eastern European state which made, as in 1958, a declaration on 
the innocent passage of warships. Democratic Yemen and Oman declared that they would 
require prior permission for the innocent passage of warships. 213 
The advocates of a right of innocent passage for warships also made statements. For ex-
ample the Ukrainian delegate, as the representative of the Warsaw Pact B1oc pointed out . 
that both amendments, if adopted would disturb the existing balance and it would destroy 
the package of deal: , 
''The unlimited right to establish an authorisation regime governing the passage of 
ships along traditional ship routes .... could be abused by States claiming an al-
209 LOS Bull Special Issue March 1987, p. 3 quoted by Brown p. 70 
210 LOS Bull Special Issue March 1987, p. 8 quoted by Brown p. 70 
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leged threat to their security. To protect their security interests, coastal States 
would even be able to prevent the passage of foreign merchant vessels. However , 
no agreement was necessary, since the articles 18 to 21 together with the articles 
29 to 32, which established rules applicable to warships, created the necessary 
system of guarantees for the security and other interests of the coastal state. "214 
ii 2.6.2.3. Conclusion 
_; 
It was surprising that only 15 years after Geneva 1958 the main adversaries on this issue 
pleaded for a right of innocent passage of warships through the territorial sea. What could 
be the reason for the Soviet Union to reverse its policy? The reason for this is the same as 
for the traditional naval powers. After UNCLOS I the Soviet Union and its allies were 
forced, because of the armaments race with the NATO to build a large naval fleet. This 
development is similar to that of the USA The USA used to be a traditional opponent of 
the right of innocent passage for warships. They became a big naval power through the 
large scale naval battles with Japan in the years 1941-45. The reason for the antagonism 
between USA and Soviet Union at UNCLOS I was, that the Soviet Union did not have a 
big naval fleet. This changed during the 1960's and 1970's. After UNCLOS I the opposi-
tion to innocent passage of warships shifted to a group of developing states In naval mat-
ters these states are like the USA 80 years ago and the Soviet Union 50 years ago. They 
'· 
have small naval or coastguard fleets or nothing. From this point of view the opposition to 
_ the right, was understandable. During the negotiations at UNCLOS ill it became apparent 
for the superpowers, that it was impossible to establish an article, which confirmed equal 
passage right for merchantships and warships. Hence the Informal Single Negotiating Text 
of 1975 which confirmed such a right, was dropped. The tactic of the naval powers (UK, 
France, USA, USSR) was now to avoid any discussion or at least any vote on this prob-
lem and to preserve the unregulated situation of TSC to the topic. The usage of States 
which required authorisation or notification, to contact the naval attaches in the case of 
214 UNCLOS III Off. Rec., Vol. XVII p.86, para 47 quoted by Brown p. 71 
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intended passage, worked quite well and without problems. Any change would disturb the 
understanding between the superpowers. 
At UNCLOS ID this system seemed to be in danger. The proposed amendments would 
disturb the delicate negotiating balance reflected in the formulation of art. 21 and might if 
adopted, oblige leading maritime powers to decline to sign the convention. The difficulty 
was put bluntly by the Italian delegation, commenting on the two amendments. It stated 
that if the questions of navigation and overflight were to be reformulated a number of 
maritime powers, including the United States215, would not sign the Convention.216 . The 
statements of Fr~ce and the United States at the Montego Bay session showed satisfac-
tion in that art. 21 had survived unscathed. The French delegation pointed out that a com-
promise between the coastal States and the marine powers was reached and" ... that the 
right of innocent passage of all vessels through territorial waters is unambiguously con-
1 • firmed."217 The United States delegation declared : " ... the Conference record supports the 
traditional United States position concerning innocent passage in the territorial sea."218 
There is also the privately stated view of the former President of the Conference Ambas-
sador Koh, which is not part of the official Conference record. He stated at an academic 
symposium six months after the Conference: 
"I think the Convention is quite clear on this point. Warships do, like other ships, 
have a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, and there is no need for 
warships to acquire the prior consent or even notification of the coastal State."219 
215 The United States have not signed the Convention yet, but the reason for this was the unsatifatory 
situation in regard to Deep Seabed Mining. 
216 Brown p. 71 
217 UNCLOS ill Off. Rec., Vol. XVII, p. 86 para. 47 quoted by Brown p. 71 
218 UNCLOS ill Off. Rec., Vol. XVII, p. 117, para 8 quoted by Brown p. 71 
219 Address by Ambassador T.T.B. Koh, Duke Symposium on the Law of the Sea 24 Virginia J.I.L. 1984 
p. 854 quoted by Brown p. 72 
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2.6.3. Development in the late 1980' s 
2.6.3.J. Changes in the Soviet legislation 
In 1983 the Soviet Union adopted new regulations on the innocent passage of foreign 
warships in Soviet territorial waters220 . The new rules seemed to be a significant departure 
from the old Soviet position in regard to foreign warships in territorial waters and re-
·.o; .. _, 
fleeted the new Soviet attitude during the negotiations at UNCLOS ill. Most strikingly 
absent was the previously maintained requirement for prior authorisation. The decree of 
t~e USSR Council of Ministers had the following content: 
" ... innocent passage of foreign warships through the territ9rial waters (territorial sea) of 
the USSR for the purpose of traversing the territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR 
without entering internal waters and ports of the USSR shall be permitted along routes 
normally used for international navigation : 
- in the Black Sea according to the traffic separation in the area ofKypy Peninsula and the 
area of the Porkkala lighthouse 
- in the Sea of Okhotsk according to the traffic separation schemes in die area of Cape 
Aniva and the fourth Kurile strait 
- in the Sea of Japan according to the traffic separation system in the area of Cape 
Kril' on"221 
220 The act calls 'Law of the State Boundary OfThe U.S.S.R' [Entered into force, March 1, 1983]. Art. 
13 'Foreign warships, and also submarines means of transport, shall effectuate innocent passage through 
the territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR in the procedure established by the USSR Council of 
Ministers. In so doing, submarines and other submarine means of transport should navigate on the surface 
and under their own flag'.; Source: International Legal Materials Vol. XXII 1983 p. 1060 
221 Rules for Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign Warships in the Territorial Waters of the USSR and the 
Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR; art. 12 (1) quoted by Juda p. 112 
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This was not a general recognition by the US SR of a right of innocent passage of warships 
in the territorial waters, but a step forward. 
2. 6.3.2. The "Jackson Hole" statement 
The USA soon challenged the Soviet position as part of its freedom of navigation pro-
gram. 222 The freedom of navigation program involved the use of US ships and aircraft to 
reassert rights under international law off the coast of foreign countries which made ob-
jectionable claims;Jn February 1988 the USA sent two cruisers to the twelve nautical mile 
territorial sea of the Soviet Union near the Crimean Peninsula in an area what was not 
mentioned in the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers. Shortly after entrance the 
American ships were approached by Soviet destroyers. After a while the Soviet vessels 
; bumped the American warships. The United States Government reacted to this event with 
a diplomatic protest. 223 
As a result of the policy of Perestroika many Soviet positions changed. On September 23, 
1989, Secretary of State Baker and the Soviet Foreign Minister Schevardnadze issued a 
. "Joint Statement With Attached Uniform Interpretation Of The Rules Of International 
Law Governing Innocent Passage" the so-called the "Jackson Hole" statement. That 
documents reflects a common understanding of the United States and indicates a signifi-
cant modification in the Soviet policy on the right of innocent passage of foreign warships 
in the territorial waters of the Soviet Union. 224 The relevant provisions reg~ding innocent -
passage of warships are: 
2. All ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, armament or means of pro-
pulsion enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in accor-
dance with international law, for which is neither prior notification nor authorisa-
tion is required. 




3. Article 19 of the Convention of 1982 sets out in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list 
of activities that would render the passage not innocent. A passing ship through 
the territorial sea that does not engage in any of these activities is in innocent pas-
sage_ 22s 
This was a huge step forwards. For the first time the superpower USSR recognised a right 
of innocent passage of foreign warships. The provisions of the understanding should serve 
and still serve to reduce the potential for violent confrontations between the two biggest 
naval powers. 
3~ Right of innocent passage for submarines and military aircraft 
3.1. Submarines 
The issue, whether submarines have a right of innocent passage or not is not so old as the 
same issue for warships. Submarines, as an invention, are much younger than warships. 
They were brought into _action in the first world war as a military weapon. Hence, after 
World War I the discussion about submarines started. The discussion since 1925 went 
more in the direction that submarines should navigate on the surface in the territorial sea. 
"In 1925, Diena proposed that a draft on the territorial sea under the consideration 
by the Institut de Droit International should incorporate a provision to this effect, 
on the argumenfthat the coastal state could not verify the pacific character of the 
passage unless the submarine was on the surface. Schiicking adopted this proposal 
in his report to the Preparatory Commission. "226 
Hence art. 12 of the Hague Codification Conference provided: "Submarines shall navigate 
on the surface. "727 In the ILC discussion, this sentence was · adopted without difficulties. 
225 International Legal Materials VoLXXVIII 1989 p. 1446 
226 O'Connell p. 295 
227 quoted by De Vries p.46 
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The same happened at the Geneva Conference in 1958. Art. 14 (6) states: "Submarines are 
required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. "228 After this it was clear, that 
submarines enjoyed right of innocent passage. The same provision was adopted without 
difficulties at UNCLOS III as art. 20 LOSC. The discussion has gone rather in the direc-
tion whether breach of the requirement to remain on the surface negates the right of inno-
cent passage. Some naval circles believes that art. 14 ( 6) is to be read in connection with 
art. 14(4) and art. 16 TSC, which allows the coastal state to take necessary steps in its 
territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent and hence it is possible to attack a 
submerged subm,~ne. 229 This in my opinion is exaggeration. Art. 16 does not entitle the 
coastal State to use force. The use of force is forbidden under the UN Charter art. 2 ( 4). 
Self-defence under art. 51 of the Charter would only be allowed if a submerged submarine 
attacks the coastal State. However it could be difficult to decide, whether a submerged 
submarine has peaceful purposes in the territorial waters or not. Fitzmaurice argues: "A 
submarine that traverses in the territorial sea submerged, "Or not showing her flag, may 
possibly not be in innocent passage, but this will not be because she is submerged or not 
showing her flag."230 He says that innocent passage is not dependent on navigation on the 
surface and according to art. 23 TSC, the coastal State can only require the warship to 
leave. There is also another phenomenon. Submarines are allowed to traverse territorial 
waters. For warships the right is disputed. In my opinion it would be possible to rely the 
threat argument also in the case of surfaced submarines, because it is possible to build 
huge submarines with a lot of military equipment. Hence it is argued that because subma- . 
\ 
rines have the right to traverse on the surface in innocent passage in the territorial sea, 
there should be the same rule for warships too. Another argument would be that most of 
submarines are of a military nature. However, the right of innocent passage of submarines 
is established in art. 14 (6) TSC and art. 20 LOSC. 
228 This sentence was ~dopted under the general rules for innocent passage in the territorial sea, sec ill. 
Right of Innocent Passage. 
229 O'Connell p. 295 




3.2. Military aircra'ft 
Innocent passage of aircraft in this content is to understood as the right tq overfly over the 
territorial sea. The Paris Convention 1919 confirmed the identity of air~pace above with 
the national territory. That means also territorial waters were included. 231\ Art. 1 TSC and 
I 
art. 2 of LOSC confirm this principle. Hence it is necessary to get penhlssion from the 
I 
coastal State for a right of overflight. The question whether the operation1 of naval aircraft 
is an incident of innocent passage was foreclosed by the Chicago Conveiition which pro-
hibits overflights.by military aircraft. 232 LOSC prohibits in art. 19 para 2: 
( e) the launching, landing or talcing on board of any aircraft 
(f) the launching, landing or talcing on board ofby any military device 
./ 
from a ship in innocent passage to be prejudicial to the peace, good ord . r or security of 
. I 
the coastal state. ! 
i 
' 
lience, there is no right of overflight for aircraft over the territorial sea. 
4. Concluding observations 
The dispute about foreign warship's right of innocent passage in territorial }vaters is old. It 
i 
started when ironclad warships began to navigate near the shore in the territorial waters of 
I 
coastal States, not being dependent on wind and currents. The arguments in favour and 
I 
against were the same from the beginning of the dispute in the 19th century to the present 
I 
time. The main argument against was, and still is the threat to the s~curity of the coastal 
I 
State. The main argument in favour was, and still is "freedom of navigation:" and the equal 
231 O'Connell p. 297 
232 O'Connell p. 297 
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treatment of warships and merchant ships. The dispute was dealt with in detail in the early 
literature and in early state practice. 233 The early attempts at codification of the law of the 
sea dealt with this topic too. The culmination was reached at the Geneva Conference 
1958, where neither the advocates nor the opponents were victorious and the situation 
was still unresolved. Nothing changed at UNCLOS ill. The text of LOSC is nearly the 
same as that of TSC. However one big change occurred at UNCLOS III. The opponents 
of the right lost a big ally and supporter, the Soviet Union. The reason for this is that it 
became a naval superpower and needed passage rights for warships. Only developing 
countries still obj:cted. The dispute came to a preliminary end in 1989, when the naval 
superpowers both recognised the right. 
Is the dispute now over? Is the joint statement enough to assert that a new rule of interna-
tional customary law is born, which says that warships enjoy a right of innocent passage 
too? A rule of international customary law is born, when nearly all states participate in a 
similar practice over a certain period of time. At the time when the USA and the Soviet 
Union concluded the joint statement, a respectable number of states (mostly developing 
countries) still required previous notification or authorisation. These included also the big 
naval power People's Republic of China which still insists on prior authorisation.234 Under 
these circumstances is it doubtful to speak about a new trend in general international cus-
tomary law. The "Jackson Hole" statement is rather the end point of a convergence in re-
gard to this topic between the superpowers USA and USSR which started at UNCLOS 
ill. It is also doubtful, whether the agreement between the Soviet Union and the USA has · 
'· 
the same value as in 1989. The Soviet and now the Russian naval fleet is in decline, espe-
cially the nuclear-powered vessels and submarines in the port of Murmansk. The Russian 
government does not have the money for maintenance. The Black Sea fleet is partly 
claimed by the Ukraine, as an inheritance from the Soviet Union. Under these circum-
stances it would not be surprising, if Russia reverted to its 1958 position. Hence we can 
say the dispute is still open and new developments are certainly to be expected. 
233 see pages before and statement of Elihu Root 
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